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Abstract 
This major paper attempts to establish the sources of ethnic segregation in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, Israel, 
through a comparative study of the city’s development and that of Casablanca, Morocco; through 
historical research specific to Tel-Aviv’s development prior to the establishment of the State of Israel 
and the city’s unification with Jaffa; and through the case study of a segregated neighbourhood in the 
city’s heart. This study is informed mainly by Lorenzo Veracini’s theorization of settler-colonialism and 
Carl Nightingale’s work on segregation. Settler-colonialism’s imperative to control the land and the 
population economy relies on continuous and expanding segregation. Both of these imperatives in turn 
benefit the real-estate economy, and all three rely on a planning framework as their rationalization and 
as a solution for their internal and mutual contradictions. The population hierarchy that developed 
under pre-state Zionism and after the formation of Israel relied on a division between Jews and non-
Jews, as well as between ethnic classes of Jews. An exploration of this latter division is central to this 
work, and relies on insights from several Israeli scholars, as well as on Edward Said’s conception of 
orientalism. 
Tel-Aviv, as a settler-colonial city, has relied on a buffer population of internal others to mediate its 
antagonistic relations with its progenitor, Jaffa, and the artificial social hierarchy thus created has had its 
own internal contradictions with repercussions that reverberate to this day. Tel-Aviv both drew from 
Zionism’s ideology and helped shape it as it quickly became Palestine’s largest Jewish settlement and 
the centre of Zionist institutions in Palestine. 
This paper’s relevance is heightened by the recent political and cultural resurgence in Israel of 
Palestinian and subaltern Jewish groups, including the more established Mizrahi population, as well as 
more recent immigrant groups such as Ethiopian- and Russian-Israelis. A study of the historical sources 
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of segregation could form the basis for an understanding of its contemporary manifestations, as well as 
inform attempts at its dissolution.  
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Foreword 
This Major Research Paper is the culmination of two years of study towards a Master’s degree in the 
Planning stream of Environmental Studies at York University. I have long had an interest in urban 
planning, but had not pursued it academically and professionally for a variety of reasons. However, a 
year of interning at the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) under Member of Knesset Dov Khenin, during 
which I worked on transportation issues, as well as on general correspondence with the public, exposed 
me to planning issues, especially the negative side of planning. I saw how planning was used as a tool to 
further marginalize the disenfranchised, and to maintain an ethnic hierarchy through unequal allocation 
of resources and discriminatory practices, though always with the appearance of order and procedure. 
Such was the case of several Palestinian towns that were denied approval of their town planning 
schemes—and consequently, any new developments—with the excuse that they were not connected to 
a sewage treatment facility, despite the fact that the municipalities blocking the construction of such a 
facility were Jewish, some of them in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and which themselves were 
not prevented from approving new developments.  
It was with this in mind that I chose “Planning and Injustice” as the area of concentration of my plan 
of study, with the intent of studying planning from a critical perspective. Through coursework and 
independent reading at FES, I was introduced to the history of planning as a regressive tool in a wide 
range of contexts, and to the social, geographical, and historical processes that formed the background 
to this history. The insights gained from this learning process allowed me to look at current planning 
processes through a critical lens, and to seek their historic origins, which led me to look at segregation in 
Tel-Aviv-Jaffa and to try to discover its roots. Through my research I discovered that modern segregation 
has its roots in economic and ideological processes, stemming in the case of Israel/Palestine from the 
intersection of settler-colonialism and the real-estate industry. A field-experience internship with Israeli 
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planning-rights NGO Bimkom during the summer of my first year of studies exposed me to several cases 
of unequal treatment of Jewish and Palestinian localities, including neighbouring towns and mixed cities. 
Through this work I realized that the planning institutions in Israel promote an uneven development of 
the two populations, with differential allocations of planning rights and land uses. This uneven 
development relies at its core on physical and economic segregation, thus allowing planning decisions to 
appear rational and place-based, rather than ethnic-based.  
Lorenzo Veracini’s theorization on settler-colonialism and Carl Nightingale’s work on segregation form 
the basis of my discussion in this work. Settler-colonialism’s imperative to control the land and the 
population economy relies on continuous and expanding segregation. Both of these imperatives in turn 
benefit the real-estate economy, and all three rely on a planning framework as their rationalization and 
to solve their internal and mutual contradictions. The population hierarchy that developed under pre-
state Zionism and after the formation of Israel relied on a division between Jews and non-Jews, as well 
as between ethnic classes of Jews. An exploration of this latter division is also central to my work, and 
relies on several Israeli scholars, as well as on Edward Said’s conception of orientalism.  
In the preparation of this paper I am indebted to several people. My academic supervisor Stefan 
Kipfer, who helped me not only with finding a direction for this specific paper, but also through his 
teaching sparked in me an interest in historical and comparative processes, and for his critical 
engagement, encouragement, and feedback. I am also indebted to my advisor, L. Anders Sandberg, and 
to Ute Lehrer and Roger Keil from the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University, and to Laam 
Hae from the Department of Political Science at York, all of whom have taught me so much. I am further 
indebted to Dov Khenin for showing me that it is possible to tirelessly fight for a better world, and 
succeed against overwhelming odds. This work would not have been possible without the previous work 
of all of the scholars referenced in it, to whom I am grateful for sharing their wisdom. I would also like to 
thank my union, CUPE 3903, for the solidarity and for constantly fighting to make the university a better 
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place for student workers. Finally, I would like to thank my family for supporting me in my studies, 
especially my sister, Carmit Erez, for editing this and other papers, and my grandmother, Charna Galper, 
for sharing her home, company, and quirky ways with me during the past two years. 
  
8 
 
Introduction 
The main research question of this paper is: What was the space and place of internal others in the 
early days of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa?1 
Tel-Aviv has its roots in a small group of Jews from the city of Jaffa, including both Mizrahi2 (of North 
African, Asian, and Balkan origins) and Ashkenazi (of Central and Eastern European origins) Jews, yet it 
soon developed into an Ashkenazi city, with Mizrahi Jews segregated in buffer neighbourhoods. It is my 
intent in this research paper to explore ethnic relations in the early formation of the city of Tel-Aviv, and 
how they are reflected in the built environment of contemporary Tel-Aviv-Jaffa.  
To prepare for this major paper, I undertook an extensive reading program on themes of urban 
planning, segregation, colonialism and settler-colonialism, as well as historic material pertaining 
specifically to Tel-Aviv/Jaffa. In addition, I undertook more than a month of primary research at the Tel-
Aviv-Jaffa municipal archives, during which I read source material on the management and planning of 
the city during its first decades, concentrating specifically on the first two decades between 1909 and 
1929, which saw the city grow from a small garden suburb to a populous coastal town, but also from a 
separatist neighbourhood trying to come to its own under Ottoman rule, to a city trying to assert its 
dominance over its surroundings under the shift to a British Mandate rule. The archival research was 
concentrated mostly on minutes of municipal council meetings, though planning documents were also 
consulted. I believe this paper would have benefited from a more extensive archival research program, 
in terms of both time and scope, incorporating other sources from the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa archives, from 
other archives in Israel, and perhaps from Archives in the UK and Turkey, where an outside look at 
1 Throughout this paper, when referring to the unified municipality of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, I will use the official Tel-
Aviv-Jaffa naming convention. However, for the title I chose to use Tel-Aviv/Jaffa, to connote that they two cities 
are still separate ideologically and discursively, and were physically and administratively separate during the first 
half of the 20th century, to which period most of this paper refers. 
2 In this instance I use the term Mizrahi, which is the currently prevailing label for this diverse group. However, 
several terms are, and have been used for the same group, including Sephardim, and Arab-Jews. A good historical 
analysis of the evolution of the terminology is provided by Goldberg (2008) and Lehmann (2008). 
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processes occurring in Tel-Aviv could have provided a different perspective. A decade of living in Tel-
Aviv-Jaffa, in central and southern neighbourhoods as well as in Jaffa itself, has resulted in an 
attachment to the city’s eccentric and seemingly unplanned layout, but also in many questions on its 
historic origin that were not answered by the official historiography of a city born from the sands a short 
century ago. Two years of study toward a Master’s degree in the Urban Planning stream of the Faculty 
of Environmental Studies at York University have enabled me to answer some of these questions, but 
also raised countless more.  
The common story told about planning’s evolution as a field of study and practice is that it developed 
as a progressive response to issues of health and safety in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. 
However, many scholars have shown that planning has been used as a regressive tool for social control 
and for the accumulation of capital by elites.3 Throughout this work, I will attempt to highlight examples 
of urban planning’s regressive aspects as it came to be expressed in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa.  
Understanding Israel to be a settler-colonial state is imperative to the study of the spatial dynamics 
within it, and several writers provide a theoretical framework for its understanding,4 while others have 
concentrated specifically on the urban colonial question.5 Lorenzo Veracini, one of the foremost scholars 
on settler-colonialism, posits that one of the central requirements and characteristics of settler-colonial 
polities is “the exercise of autonomous control over indigenous and exogenous others: keeping both at 
bay, or selectively distributing the right to reside within the bounds of the settler polity.”6 Even before 
they established their own state, and while they were living under the political rule of others, Zionists 
insisted on and implemented this policy through the creation of autonomous settlements—urban and 
rural—whose populations were strictly controlled.  
3 Flyvbjerg, 1996; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002; Yiftachel, 1998; Nightingale, 2012; Abu-Lughod, 1980 
4 Cooper, 2005; Fanon, 2007; Veracini, 2006, 2010 
5 Abu-Lughod, 1980; King, 1990; Kipfer, 2007; Wright, 1987 
6 Veracini, 2006, p. 67 
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Another systemic contributor to spatial dynamics is racism, as theorized by Lipsitz7 and Nightingale.8 
Nightingale traces the history of segregation to the dawn of cities themselves, but draws a distinction 
between the earlier segregations that were prevalent throughout most of urban history, and the racial 
forms it took beginning with European colonialism. He sees racial segregation as originating in a colonial 
reality but drawing on metropolitan practices of economic segregation, with both forms drawing from 
each other ideologically and intellectually. Nightingale’s analysis places the birth of urban racial 
segregation in the relationship between London and Calcutta, whose colonial relationship brought into 
being the three institutions that would enable segregation to spread to other parts of the world: 
modern government institutions, networks of intellectual exchange, and the modern capitalist real-
estate industry, which especially since the late 19th century has become dependent on the urban 
planning profession.9 
One of the foremost scholars on regressive planning practices within a settler-colonial context in 
Israel is Oren Yiftachel, who formulated the concept of ethnocracy. Within an ethnocracy, a façade of 
democracy conceals a non-democratic seizure of the country’s territory and institutions by one ethnic 
group to further its interests, power, and resources.10 Alexander (Sandy) Kedar, a frequent collaborator 
with Yiftachel, has shown how legal geography has played a major part in dispossessing one ethnic 
group of its land title and transferring ownership of it to another ethnic group.11 Another contributor to 
the study of the legal geography of Israel/Palestine is Robert Home, whose time scale is broader than 
Kedar’s.12 Describing spatial injustice, Yiftachel developed the concept of ‘gray spaces’ as being those 
7 Lipsitz, 2007, 2011 
8 Nightingale, 2012 
9 Nightingale, 2012, p. 5 
10 Yiftachel, 1999 
11 Forman & Kedar, 2004; Kedar, 2003 
12 Home, 2003 
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spaces between the “’whiteness’ of legality/approval/safety, and the ‘blackness’ of 
eviction/destruction/death”.13 
Within the framework of the Israeli ethnocracy, the dominant group is commonly believed to be Jews 
in general. However, it is one group of Jews—those of Eastern European (Ashkenazi) extraction—which 
has dominated the pre-state and state apparatuses, marginalizing both the indigenous Palestinians and 
Jews of Asian, North African, and Balkan (Mizrahi or Sephardi) —and more recently of Ethiopian and 
Russian—origins.14 The pre-Mandate Jewish population of Palestine included a large Mizrahi population, 
of whom a large proportion—if not the majority—supported either an Ottoman or an Arab identity as 
opposed to the Zionist one.15 One of the purposes of this paper is to localize this internal conflict of the 
Jewish population of Palestine to the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa area. Edward Said’s conceptualization of 
Orientalism16 can be used to describe the attitude of the Zionist Ashkenazi ruling class toward the 
Mizrahi population, as recent scholarship has shown.17 
A historical and comparative analysis is important for understanding urban processes, finding 
connecting threads, as well as gaining differing and sometimes competing perspectives.18 Several writers 
have written thought-provoking historical geographic analyses of Israel/Palestine. Mark LeVine has 
conducted an in-depth study of the colonial history of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa;19 Daniel Monterescu recently 
published a study of contemporary Jaffa and its contradictions;20 Sharon Rothbard writes about the 
myth of Tel-Aviv as the ‘White City,’ concealing a ‘Black City’ both in its history as well as in its 
contemporary south;21 Yossi Katz has written about the Zionist origins of Tel-Aviv;22 and Benny Morris 
13 Yiftachel, 2009 
14 Massad, 1996; Shenhav, 2006; Shohat, 1988, 1999; Yonah & Saporta, 2002 
15 Jacobson, 2003; Klein, 2014; Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014 
16 Said, 1978 
17 Hazkani, 2015; Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005 
18 Hay,2000; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003 
19 LeVine, 2005 
20 Monterescu, 2015 
21 Rothbard, 2014 
22 Katz, 1986 
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and Ilan Pappe have both published books on the Palestinian dispossession during the Nakba [Arabic for 
Catastrophe]/1948 War.23 Janet Abu-Lughod’s history of Rabat, Morocco, provides an in-depth look at 
historical urban processes in that city specifically, but also in Morocco in general.24 
From its early conception, Tel-Aviv was to be an ordered Jewish suburb, based on the ideals of 
Ebenezer Howard’s Garden Cities. This order was to include both its built form, and its population make-
up, which was envisioned as “100% Hebrew,” a vision that would be enshrined in the suburb’s 
regulations, which “forbade selling or letting houses in the Tel-Aviv suburb to Arabs”.25 However, we 
know that early Zionist leaders also saw non-Ashkenazi Jews as a threat to the Zionist project and 
stressed the importance of physical separation.26 The question to be answered in this work is whether 
Tel-Aviv developed with the same ‘ideals’ as those held by the wider Zionist movement. 
Ever since Ashkenazi Jews, those of Central and Eastern European origin, became a numerical 
majority and the hegemonic group within Palestine’s Jewish community in the late-19th and early-20th 
centuries, other Jewish groups living there have been labelled in relation to them, rather than as a result 
of an historical-cultural analysis. One such label, Sephardic Jews, in fact referred originally to Jews of 
Spanish extraction. While they lived in the Iberian Peninsula, Jewish communities maintained distinctive 
regional identities, such as Castilian, Andalusian, or Portugesi, but following the forced conversion and 
expulsion of Spain’s (and several years later, Portugal's) Jews, these diverse communities came to be 
known by a unified label of Sephardic, for the Hebrew name for Spain since medieval times – 
Sepharad.27 Following the expulsion of Iberian Jewry in the 1490s, Sephardic Jews spread to different 
23 Morris, 2004; Pappe, 2006 
24 Abu-Lughod, 1980 
25 Katz, 1986, p. 408 
26 Massad, 1996, pp. 54-55. Massad’s piece gives several examples of early Zionist notables from across the 
political spectrum denigrating ‘Oriental’ Jews, and advocating for segregation from them and against 
miscegenation with them. Another piece dealing with this subject is Ella Shohat’s Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from 
the Perspective of its Jewish Victims. 
27 Goldberg, 2008, p. 169 
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parts of the Muslim Mediterranean, to Western Europe, and to the Americas,28 where Jewish 
communities had already existed for centuries and in some cases for millennia. Though they shared 
several commonalities with these communities, they sometimes maintained their separation from 
them.29 In addition, there were non-Ashkenazi Jewish communities that had little contact with these 
Sephardic exiles, including those of Babylonia (modern day Iraq), Persia (Iran), and Yemen. By the late 
18th century, as European Orientalism took hold, dividing the world into a Manichaean east/west binary, 
the division within Jewry also became more binary, partly ignoring locally and culturally specific 
distinctions in favour of all-encompassing categories. However, this process was in no way complete, 
and “plural systems of categorization … coexisted with Orientalist binary perceptions.”30 During the late-
19th- and early-20th-century migrations of Jews to Palestine, newcomer communities maintained their 
cultural distinctions, for example in the case of Yemenite Jews, who saw themselves and were seen by 
others, both Ashkenazi and Sephardi, as distinct.31 However, already in the first decades of the 20th 
century there were cases of Ashkenazi leaders and workers in Tel-Aviv setting themselves apart (and 
above) from all other categories of Jews, perhaps beginning a process that would reach its culmination 
after the establishment of the State of Israel, when the binary distinction would become common 
categorizations, both colloquially and within government bureaucracy.32 
I noticed the first sign of historical segregation in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa while researching the essay that would 
become chapter three of this paper. A single line in one of the sources about the displaced communities 
that would become the residents of the Givat Amal Bet quarter in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa stated that they were 
refugees from buffer neighbourhoods, and that they were mostly Mizrahi. Having learned the official 
history of Tel-Aviv as a city of European settlers choosing to build a modern city in the sands, I wondered 
28 Lehmann, 2008, p. 82 
29 Goldberg, 2008, pp. 169-170; Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2000, p. xix 
30 Goldberg, 2008, p. 171 
31 Goldberg, 2008, pp. 172-173 
32 Though the actual terminology used would be debated and changed for decades (Goldberg, 2008, pp. 175-176).  
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where these Mizrahi settlers came from, and why they were in the buffer neighbourhoods during the 
1948 war. Existing critical geographies of the city focused mostly on its relation to the Arab city of Jaffa, 
from which it grew, and on the relation between the two, both during Tel-Aviv’s early years, and 
following the latter’s annexation of Jaffa after the 1948 war. However, I found that there is a lack of 
literature on the space and place of the southern neighbourhoods in both periods, and on their 
population. My aim was to find the sources of this ethnic segregation, if it in fact existed. Was this a 
question of personal choice based on cultural affinity to Arab Jaffa, of economic necessity, or was it that 
they were not wanted in Tel-Aviv? Though the results of my research are inconclusive, I believe that it 
shows a clear bias by Tel-Aviv’s early leaders and power-brokers against Mizrahi Jews, and a continued 
policy of neglect applied to their neighbourhoods. I believe there is room to expand on this question, as 
due to time and resource constraints my research was far from exhaustive, especially as it pertains to 
primary archival sources.  
The research question for this paper has its roots in an assumption that current geographic 
inequalities in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa are based on ethnicity, with a largely Ashkenazi north dominating a largely 
Mizrahi south.33 In order to answer this question, we must first confirm that segregation and inequality 
exist.  
A 2004 analysis of 1,000 respondents in Tel-Aviv found that 63% of those who identify as Ashkenazi34 
lived in northern neighbourhoods, while 54% of self-identified Mizrahi and 90% of self-identified 
Bucharians (Central Asian non-Ashkenazi Jews) lived in southern neighbourhoods, with between 10%-
20% of each group living in the central neighbourhoods. Interestingly, African asylum seekers, who could 
33 The marginalization and discrimination of Jaffa’s Arabs is not within the scope of this work. For a recent analysis 
see Monterescu, 2015. 
34 39% of respondents self-identified as “Israelis”. “Israelis are those who do not assign themselves any sub-
identity either because they were born into ethnically mixed marriages or they are at least three generations in 
Israel and they chose not to assign their origin any significance.” The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, which used 
different definitions, finds a higher representation of Ashkenazim and Mizrahim in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa than Schnell & 
Benjamini’s survey (Schnell & Benjamini, 2004, p. 452). 
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be said to occupy the lowest rung of the current Tel-Aviv-Jaffa social ladder, are also concentrated 
overwhelmingly in the south.35 
As for inequality, on the national level, a recent study found that in 2014 Ashkenazi workers’ wages 
were 38% above the national average, while Mizrachi workers’ wages were 12% above the national 
average.36 Another recent study based on Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) data found that 28.8% of 
second-generation Mizrahi immigrants have a university degree, as opposed to 49.6% of second-
generation Ashkenazim, despite both groups having been born in Israel and educated in ostensibly the 
same education system.37 Within Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, residents and activists in the city’s south have 
complained for decades about the lack of an academic high school in the south, having only technical 
schools available. The Ministry of Education itself recognized the inequality inherent in the system, and 
initiated a school integration reform, which saw large numbers of students from the south bussed to 
schools in the north (but not the other way around). However, rather than integrating, this reform did 
much to highlight the differences between the two ‘classes’ of students, and has had less than optimal 
results.38 In the southern neighbourhood of Neve-Sha’anan 28.2% of residents do not have a high-school 
matriculation certificate, and only 15.3% have an academic degree. In the northern neighbourhood of 
Ramat-Aviv Gimel only 8.5% of residents do not have a high-school matriculation certificate, while 
45.9% have an academic degree. In Neve-Sha’anan, 27.8% of residents are considered white-collar 
workers and 34.6% are considered unskilled workers, while in Ramat-Aviv Gimel 72.3% are white-collar 
and only 1.2% are unskilled.39 A shift to semi-privatized management of Tel-Aviv’s schools almost two 
decades ago, which allows the schools to rent out facilities after hours and use the income as they see 
35 Schnell & Benjamini, 2004, p. 454 
36 Swirski et al, 2015, p. 14. Arab workers’ wages were 29% below the national average. Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in 
the survey refer to Israeli-born second-generation.  
37 Kashti, O. (2015, November 9). Study: Mizrahi-Ashkenazi Higher-Ed Gaps Wider than Ever. Haaretz. Retrieved 
from: http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.684990. 
38 Dorfman et al., 1994 
39 “Sub-Quarter,” 2013, paras. 9-10 
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fit, has shown that current inequalities will only be exacerbated: southern primary schools earn an 
average of 7,853 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) a year under this scheme, while northern primary schools 
average an income of 125,741 NIS. Southern high schools earn 32,200 NIS on average, compared to the 
178,450 NIS on average earned by northern high schools.40 
The following work is divided into three chapters: Chapter 1 is a comparative historical narrative of 
the development of Tel-Aviv and of Casablanca, Morocco. The two cities developed as European colonial 
outgrowths of traditional Arab cities along similar timelines. As such, they were informed by the same 
climate of modernist colonial planning, as well as by similar notions of European exclusivity and the 
need for segregation from ‘native’ cities. However, the two cities also developed under different 
imperatives, with Casablanca developing within a colonialist regime, and Tel-Aviv developing within the 
logic of settler-colonialism. Therefore, though similarities are helpful, it is the dissimilarities that best 
help to explain the dynamics of development. In conducting this comparison, I try to locate the place of 
internal others in both cities, both literally and figuratively, as a buffer population between the 
colonizing Europeans and the indigenous majority. Chapter 2 provides a more in-depth study of the 
space and place of Mizrahi Jews in Tel-Aviv during its formative years. As stated above, there is a lack of 
primary data and secondary knowledge on this specific issue, and therefore this chapter will include the 
primary sources I could find, as well as secondary sources that are partly not Tel-Aviv specific, but which, 
by pointing to certain tendencies within the larger Jewish establishment and community in Palestine, 
could shed some light on processes within Tel-Aviv itself. Chapter 3 is a historic study of the 
aforementioned Givat Amal Bet neighbourhood, which was a Palestinian farming village before Tel-Aviv 
expanded around it, and whose residents were displaced during the 1948 war only to be replaced by 
Jewish refugees from the city’s southern neighbourhoods. This neighbourhood was recently the site of a 
second expulsion, as these refugees and their descendants were removed to make way for a luxury 
40 “School,” 2013, para. 5 and graph 
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condominium development. I believe that the case of Givat Amal Bet encapsulates and highlights the 
contradictions of settler-colonial urban development and its segregationist drive within an existing 
indigenous geography, as well as the underlying role of real-estate in promoting as well as hindering 
both. 
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Chapter 1: A Comparative Study of the 
Early Years of Colonial Casablanca and 
Tel-Aviv 
"The European city is not the prolongation of the native city. The colonizers have not settled in the midst of the 
natives. They have surrounded the native city; they have laid siege to it. Every exit from the Kasbah...opens on 
enemy territory" - Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism 
Introduction 
The early decades of the twentieth century saw the birth and growth of two modern cities, both 
beginning as ‘European’ outgrowths of traditional Middle-Eastern walled cities, but in a short time 
outgrowing and outshining them. While French urban colonialism in Morocco, specifically in Casablanca 
for the purpose of this paper, was based on a policy of ‘association’41, the Jewish colonization of 
Palestine, and specifically of Tel-Aviv, was based on what could be termed dissociation, a policy of 
physical and economic separation and segregation from the indigenous population. 
The Ville Nouvelle of Casablanca grew out of the city’s Muslim Medina in a planned process of French 
colonization, incorporating the lessons learned in the previous century in Algeria and Tunisia. Whereas 
the urban colonization of Algiers was initially based on the principle of physical assimilation of the 
indigenous population through the placement of colonists directly within the existing city, the 
establishment of a French protectorate in Tunisia fifty years later (1881)42 already saw the transition to a 
colonization of association. This transition was fully completed in Casablanca and other French 
Moroccan cities in the early decades of the twentieth century, when “as resident-general of the new 
41 Wright, 1987, p. 298 
42 Lewis, 2008, p. 802 
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protectorate of Morocco between 1912 and 1925, Hubert Lyautey refined his concept of the ‘dual city’ 
which we would call a form of geographical ‘association.’”43 
The new Jewish city of Tel-Aviv grew out of the Arab city of Jaffa, but before the first cornerstone was 
even laid in the dunes to Jaffa’s north, Meir Diezengoff, a Jewish leader of Jaffa and the future first and 
long-time mayor of Tel-Aviv, boasted about forming a “state within a state” in Jaffa.44 During Tel-Aviv’s 
first twelve years, while it was still officially a neighbourhood of Jaffa, its leaders attempted to make it 
“completely independent”, a goal they would achieve through town planning.45 
In both cities, the different logics of colonialism and settler-colonialism played out differently, but 
both aspired to a physical and cultural segregation of different populations and both relied on a buffer 
population to enact their policies. The real-estate industry and professional urban planning had different 
effects in the two cities, in colonialist Casablanca property speculation interfered with planned 
segregation, while in settler-colonial Tel-Aviv it helped to promote it. 
Historical Background 
Both Casablanca and Jaffa have ancient roots, but both cities in the early twentieth century were in 
the process of recovery from complete destruction visited upon them centuries earlier. Casablanca’s 
predecessor, Anfa, had already existed before the twelfth century, but was destroyed by the Portuguese 
in the fifteenth century and subsequently abandoned by its population. Three centuries would pass 
before the city was resurrected in 1770 by Sultan Mohammed ben Abdallah under the name Dar el 
Beida, though it would remain a minor coastal settlement until the twentieth century.46 Jaffa, with a 
history spanning millennia, was completely destroyed by Salah ad-Din’s forces in 1196, and though it 
43 Wright, 1987, p. 300 
44 LeVine, 1998, p. 40 
45 LeVine, 1998, p. 40 
46 Puschmann, 2011, p. 47 
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was rebuilt a couple of centuries later, a 1726 description of it says that “it has no walls, is ‘more like a 
farm than a city.’”47 
Precolonial Incorporation into the World Capitalist System 
Between 1830 and 1852 Morocco was brought into the world capitalist system after years of self-
imposed, mercantilist-motivated isolation in trade. In 1828 grain export restrictions were lifted and in 
1831, following growing European demand due to technical innovations in textile production, the 
restrictions on wool exports were lifted as well. At the same time, imports of goods on a large scale also 
began, with tea imports skyrocketing from 3,500 kg in 1830 to 300,000 kg in 1840, and sugar imports 
climbing as well, though at a slower pace. Much of this trade was conducted through Casablanca, which 
grew in importance relative to older port cities such as Rabat, whose industrial base was undermined by 
the imported textiles and other manufactured goods.48 The import of products such as textiles and 
candles, and the closing off of traditional trade routes to the Arab east and African south by European 
colonization led to a drastic change in Morocco’s domestic economy. Reduced demand for cotton by the 
domestic textile industry and for animal skins by the leather industry undermined the inland nomadic 
tribes’ economic base, as well as the urban leather and textile manufacturing sectors.49 
In 1840, the nine-year long Egyptian occupation of Jaffa ended following pressure from European 
countries, especially England. However, the Egyptian migrants who had followed Ibrahim Pasha’s army 
and remained behind improved the Jaffa orange groves, making Jaffa’s oranges famous thereafter.50 In 
addition, businessmen from Beirut planted strawberry plantations around the al-Auja (Yarkon) river and 
47 LeVine, 2005, p. 29 
48 Abu-Lughod, 1980, pp. 85, 90 
49 Abu-Lughod, 1980, pp. 106-107 
50 The Egyptians are also credited with building the first neighbourhood outside the walls of Jaffa, Manshiyye. 
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set up a silk industry. At the same time, steam ships started frequenting Jaffa’s port. A fledgling soap 
industry was also present in the city at the time, exporting its products to Syria.51 
Lines of communication in Palestine began improving in 1868, with the first road adapted for wheeled 
carriages paved between Jerusalem and Jaffa, followed the same year by the Jerusalem-Nablus road. 
The Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, later connected to the Hadjaz railway, was laid between 1890 and 1892.52 
In 1885 Jaffa exported 106,000 crates of oranges worth 26,500 pounds,53 that number rising to 
200,000 crates worth 83,120 pounds five years later. Total trade in 1886 was valued at 360,435 pounds, 
and in 1890 at 706,821 pounds. In 1888 the city’s walls were dismantled and a customs house was built, 
as was a boat house to handle increased port activity (Jaffa Port’s rocky outcrops prevented docking of 
large ships, which would anchor offshore to be unloaded by small boats). The dock was enlarged, a new 
quay was installed, and new warehouses and stores were built by private individuals.54 
Most of the exports from Jaffa during the second half of the 19th century were of agricultural products 
to the European market, primarily cereals. Oranges were exported primarily to Egypt and Turkey, until 
1873 when exports to Europe began as well. The next most valuable exports were sesame seeds for the 
European soap industry and olive oil. Cotton grown in the Nablus hills was also exported through Jaffa, 
especially following the sharp rise in prices on the international market during the Crimean and 
American Civil Wars. However, once prices dropped sharply in the 1870s exports dropped accordingly.55 
At the same time, imports of coffee, sugar, and rice increased. 56  
51 Droyanov, 1936, p. 21 
52 Bachi, 1976, p. 33 
53 The text is not clear about the currency. 
54 Droyanov, 1936, p. 31 
55 Owen, 1993, pp. 177-178 
56 Owen, 1993, p. 179 
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Prelude to Colonization 
By the second half of the 19th century, Casablanca had grown in importance as a trading centre, being 
set up by European powers as a port to circumvent the Moroccan Sultan’s power and becoming 
Morocco’s prime port town by 1906, just before the establishment of the French Protectorate.57 Jaffa’s 
resurrection occurred earlier than Casablanca’s, spurred by internal struggles for power and prestige 
within the Ottoman administration. By the early-19th century it had become the most important port in 
Palestine and by the 1830s new neighbourhoods were being built outside of the old city’s walls, as it 
began to draw Arab immigrants from neighbouring countries as well as Jewish immigrants from both 
North Africa and Europe.58 
As the cities grew in size and trade volume, their sea ports began to hinder further growth. Jaffa’s 
port was described in one report as “little more than an open roadstead,”59 while Casablanca’s port was 
so shallow that it could only support sloops, forcing steamboats to drop anchor offshore.60 In 1906, 
shortly before official colonization of Morocco began, the European powers decided to expand 
Casablanca’s harbour facilities, exemplifying the economic significance of colonization. In fact, an assault 
by Moroccans on European labourers employed in the port expansion project would be used as a 
pretext for a French military occupation of Casablanca beginning in 1907, which along with the military 
occupation of Oujda on the Algerian border would form the beginning of colonization, culminating in an 
official protectorate status in 1912.61 The port of Jaffa, on the other hand, would not be expanded 
despite several European and Ottoman proposals to that effect.62 
European countries tried to increase their influence over both Morocco and Palestine starting in the 
18th century. Limited concessions given to European countries in Morocco in the 18th century were 
57 Puschmann, 2011, p. 48; Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 33 
58 LeVine, 2005, pp. 31-32 
59 LeVine, 2005, p. 34 
60 Puschmann, 2011, p. 48 
61 Puschmann, 2011, pp. 49-50 
62 LeVine, 2005, p. 34 
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renewed and extended in 1818, and a series of capitulation agreements were forced on the Sultan, by 
England in 1856, Spain between 1859 and 1860, and France in 1863.63 France and Spain were 
negotiating the division of Morocco into respective spheres of influence in 1904,64 and in response 
Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaimed Morocco’s independence and integrity during a 1905 visit to Tangier.65 
European influence in Palestine grew following the Crimean War in 1856, when previously temporary 
capitulations made by the Ottoman Empire to European Empires became law. One feature of these 
capitulations was the protégé system, whereby Ottoman subjects could acquire a foreign nationality and 
the capitulatory privileges that came with it, including tax exemption and legal protection.66 The more 
such protégés they had, the more influence the European powers could gain within the Ottoman 
Empire, which led to a competition over who would get to grant protective status to the Jews in 
Palestine.67 Though the capitulations enabled European economic penetration into Palestine, political 
influence was not so easily gained despite the benefits of the protégé system, as local and Ottoman 
officials resisted it. To gain footholds in the territory, and as part of a struggle for influence, the French 
and British began to invest in schools and other cultural institutions, which were “considered by both 
the Ottoman government and the Europeans themselves [as] spearheads of European colonialism and 
imperial rivalry”.68 The Zionist colonial movement began to gain a physical foothold in Palestine in the 
1880s, setting up 25 agricultural colonies between 1882 and 1905, while plans for an urban Zionist 
colonization would wait until the middle of the first decade of the 20th century due to a lack of initiatives 
and sources of funding.69 
63 Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 85 
64 Puschmann, 2011, p. 49 
65 Oteri-Pailos, 1998, para. 15 
66 A similar protégé system was put in place in Moroccan capitulation agreements, greatly benefitting the local 
entrepreneurial class (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 98). 
67 Oke, 1982, p. 333 
68 LeVine, 2005, pp. 36, 39 
69 Katz, 1986, pp. 404 
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Between 1907 and 1912, through a succession of economic, diplomatic, and military interventions, 
which in turn led to internal instability within Morocco, the French solidified their hold over Morocco, 
culminating in the acceptance by the Makhzen—Morocco’s governing elite—of a French protectorate 
over their territory.70 In December 1917, British General Edmund Allenby rode his horse into Jaffa, 
ending centuries of Ottoman rule over the city and its environs and leading the way for the British 
Mandate of Palestine.71 
Association vs. Dissociation 
Colonization of Morocco in General, and Casablanca in particular, provided an opportunity for two 
professions just emerging in France to find official support for their expertise: urbanism and the social 
sciences. These social scientists and urbanists, along with the colonial administrators, championed a 
policy that would be called association. The earlier policy practiced in Algiers—assimilation—was based 
on an assumption of French cultural predominance in language, laws, and architectural style, and on 
displaying a military prowess through destruction of indigenous cities and towns and maintaining a 
visible military presence.72 This policy came under attack, for moral reasons as well as for pragmatic 
ones after it was found to be politically and economically inefficient. Association, on the other hand, 
called for the preservation of local cultural practices, provision of social services, and, assuming that the 
first two worked to counter local resistance, reliance on a smaller and less visible military presence.73 
Notions and practices of French colonial assimilation were introduced in the 17th century, when it was 
decreed that Indigenous people who converted to Catholicism would “be considered ‘citizens and 
natural Frenchmen.’” Following the French Revolution, the idea of religious conversion was translated 
into political assimilation (Betts, 1960, p. 12). The idea of assimilation carries with it its own assumption 
70 Puschmann, 2011, p. 50 
71 LeVine, 2005, p. 83 
72 Wright, 1987, p. 298 
73 Wright, 1987, p. 299 
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of French cultural and ideological superiority while calling for the equality of all people (though 
inevitably at the time, the references were to ‘all men’), including subjugated indigenous and 
indigenized people of the colonies. It is a product of a unique mix of “Humanism, naïveté, and 
egocentrism.”74 This was a decidedly unequal equality, reminiscent of George Orwell’s ‘Animal Farm.’75 
What constituted as assimilation underwent several changes with the political upheavals in France, with 
the colonies undergoing a see-saw of emancipation and re-enslavement, representation and its reversal. 
In the case of Algeria, Emperor Louis Napoleon at first called for assimilation in 1858 to “extinguish” the 
Arab “armed and mettlesome nationality,” only to declare five years later that Algeria was an Arab 
kingdom under the umbrella of the French Empire.76 Though the merits of assimilation vs. association 
were continually debated in France, even when assimilationist policies were enacted by the 
metropolitan government for the colonies, and specifically in Algeria, these policies were often not 
implemented by the local administration in Algeria, which was dominated by French colons, who as 
settler-colonists had different objectives than the metropolitan government.77, 78 In the case of Algiers, 
though assimilation was the espoused colonial policy, the French in fact demolished and remodelled the 
lower city in their own image, while segregating the Algerian population in the upper Casbah, freezing it 
in time and space so that it could not develop organically.79 When the French conquered Tunisia, they 
enacted a ‘protectorate’ status over it for practical reasons, thinking that having a Muslim figurehead as 
apparent sovereign would quell the eruption of Arab resistance, as well as quell resistance in Paris to 
further colonization. The relative success of the Tunisian experiment resulted in the protectorate 
becoming the preferred mode of French colonialism, and the post-facto theorization of the doctrine of 
74 Gershovich, 2000, p. 20 
75 “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others” (Orwell, 2010, p. 112)(Needless to say, It is 
not my intent to compare any people with animals) 
76 Lewis, 1962, p. 135 
77 Heggoy & Zingg, 1976, p. 573.  
78 A more in-depth definition and analysis of settler-colonialism and its imperatives will be provided in Chapter 2. 
79 Çelik, 1997, p. 26 
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association, as opposed to the initial theorizing of assimilation and its subsequent unsuccessful 
enactment.80  
Zionist settler-colonization of Palestine, by contrast, would follow a policy that is best defined as 
dissociation—a purposeful distancing and distinction from the native population, geographically, 
economically, and administratively. Zionism emerged in Europe in the late 1880s as a Jewish national 
revival movement, which by the beginning of the 20th century was associated with a colonization of 
Palestine. Though Jews had lived in Palestine for millennia, and a continuous trickle of Jewish 
immigrants and pilgrims had always flocked to their historical homeland, Zionist thinkers were not 
satisfied with simply living in Eretz Israel [a traditional Hebrew name for Palestine], they wished to 
repossess it from an occupation by ‘strangers’.81 In order to take root in their new-old land they needed 
to provide a viable economic base for themselves and the large number of Jewish immigrants needed to 
fulfil their project. However, the Zionist leaders knew that “European Jewish immigrants could never 
compete with the low wages accepted by Arab workers, and thus sought to create a separate, 
exclusively Jewish economy.82 While recent European Jewish immigrants were calling for dissociation, 
some in the more established Sephardic83 Jewish community of Palestine were warning of the “danger 
of becoming a ‘separate people’ within Palestine.”84 Arthur Ruppin, a senior Zionist functionary 
complained as late as 1914 of the unwillingness of the Jews of Jaffa to display Jewish national solidarity, 
“which he blamed on the fact that they lived in mixed neighborhoods with Arabs.”85 
The different approaches taken by the French in Morocco and the Zionists in Palestine are the result 
of the differing logics of, respectively, colonialism and settler-colonialism, which are seen as not only 
80 Gershovich, 2000, p. 23 
81 Pappe, 2006, p. 11 
82 LeVine, 1995, p. 2 
83 Sephardic Jews in Palestine at the time were those Jews who came from lands under Islamic control, and were 
distinguished from Ashkenazi Jews, who came from Central and Eastern Europe. A more thorough explanation of 
this division will be provided in Chapter 2. 
84 Campos, 2005, p. 476; Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014 
85 Campos, 2005, p. 479 
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separate, but antithetical.86 Colonialism is often represented as something that is exercised over 
colonized people, while settler-colonialism, often referred to as colonization, is exercised over a 
colonized land, with a disavowal of an indigenous presence.87 An indigenous population is indispensable 
to the colonial experience, whose ultimate aim is the economic exploitation of a foreign territory 
through the extraction of surplus value, obtained by the mixing of native labour with the land.88 In the 
settler-colonial context, on the other hand, the primary aim is the land itself, and the indigenous 
population is dispensable, with its future being not exploitation, but replacement.89  
The different practices of association and dissociation in Casablanca and Tel-Aviv, then, are the results 
of the different logics of the colonial and settler-colonial regimes practiced in them. In Casablanca, and 
Morocco in general, the indigenous population was a crucial part of the economic apparatus, and the 
relatively large number of French and other European settlers was necessary to maintain the 
exploitative economic relationship, but it never approached the numbers seen in Algeria, which was 
both colonial and settler-colonial (and thus shows the limits of categorical distinctions between different 
forms of colonialism). Because the native population was indispensable to the colonial project, its 
avowed segregation was never practicable. In Tel-Aviv, on the other hand, the main purpose was 
settlement and not economic exploitation, and therefore there was a need to create a separate 
economy which would sustain the largest number of settlers possible, even if in purely economic terms 
this was inefficient.90 Therefore, we see in it an almost complete ideological, physical, and economic 
separation of populations. 
86 Veracini, 2010, p. 11 
87 Veracini, 2010, p. 14 
88 Wolfe, quoted in Veracini, 2006, p. 8 
89 Wolfe, in Veracini, 2010, p. 8 
90 For example, the Hope Simpson report, commissioned by the British Government to investigate land settlement, 
immigration, and development in Palestine in 1930, found that “Zionist settlements [are] not self-supporting,” 
relying on a continued influx of capital by Zionist institutions, as well as forgiveness of debts (Hope-Simpson 
Report, pp. 34-35, British National Archive, CAB/24/215, pp. 53-54). 
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Early Colonial Settlement 
In 1836, as a response to growing trade with Europe, a customs post was set up in Casablanca, then a 
“large village of around 1,000 inhabitants.” By the 1850s an undetermined European population was 
living in the growing town, composed mostly of Spaniards, but including “strong French, German, and 
British contingents.”91 By 1866, the town’s population increased to over six thousand, but the vast 
majority was still Moroccan. Janet Abu-Lughod asserts that it was Moroccan entrepreneurs from the 
interior, not Europeans, who were responsible for the city’s growing importance, as they tried to gain an 
advantage over established elites in the country’s traditional port towns. However, these same 
entrepreneurs were responding to a situation imposed on the country by outside forces, as France 
captured Algeria and blocked off traditional land trade routes to the north, and trade caravans from the 
south were being diverted to southern ports.92 Furthermore, the movement of rural Moroccans to 
urban centres was not the result of population pressure, as the natural rate of increase had not gone up 
at the time. Rather, it was the pressures “created by colonial expansion into the rural hinterlands, and 
[which] were intensified by the monetization of the tax system.”93 
By 1892, the European population increased within the city’s Muslim quarter to such an extent that 
the Moroccan Sultan Moulay Hassan built a European quarter in the city, Sur al-Jdid. However, this 
quarter remained empty at the beginning of the 20th century, and following French colonization would 
become a site for military installations.94 
Jaffa began attracting relatively large numbers of newcomers—Arabs, Jews, as well as Europeans— in 
the middle of the 19th century. Among the reasons cited for the city’s growth were improved security 
along overland trade routes, improvements to naval shipping with the introduction of steam ships, the 
91 Cohen, 2008, p. 1014 
92 Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 98 
93 Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 203 
94 Cohen, 2008, p. 1015 
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cancellation of internal tariffs, and the opening of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road.95 American and German 
colonies were established by religious communities in the environs of Jaffa in the second half of the 19th 
century,96 and Jewish immigration increased, mostly from North Africa, but also from Jerusalem.97 By 
1880, a tenth of the city’s estimated population of 10,000 was Jewish, and this ratio would remain as the 
city quadrupled in population by 1914.98 As the city grew in population it also grew in size, with new 
waves of immigrants forming new neighbourhoods outside the old city, such as the Manshiyyeh, Abu 
Kabir, and Rashid neighbourhoods populated by Egyptians who immigrated in the 1830s.99 Jews 
followed their Arab neighbours and also began buying land and building neighbourhoods outside the 
city walls, with the first such neighbourhood, Neve Tzedek, established in 1887, and others soon to 
follow.100 However, these new neighbourhoods were still part of Jaffa, in proximity as well as in style. 
“Homes had closed courtyards and high walls around them, with Arab-style roofs and arches; they were 
‘not just Arab in ownership but also in plan, construction and form’”.101 
By 1907, Casablanca was divided into three distinct areas, reflecting the divisions of the population. 
The Muslim quarter, covering two thirds of the city’s area, was largely inhabited by Europeans; Jews 
were housed in the Jewish quarter, or Millah; Poor newcomers, mostly Muslim immigrants from the 
countryside, built noualas [reed huts] outside of the city walls in what was known as the Tnaker 
district.102 The French military occupation of Casablanca in 1907 made it a safe and attractive 
destination for Europeans seeking their fortunes in what began to be imagined in Europe as an ‘El 
95 Ram, 1996, p. 30 
96 LeVine, 2005, p. 56 
97 Ram, 1996, p. 30 
98 Klein, 2014, p. 137 
99 LeVine, 2005, p. 38 
100 LeVine, 2005, p. 60 
101 LeVine, 2005, p. 156, quoting Ilan Shchori 
102 Cohen, 2008, p. 1015; Puschmann, 2011, p. 71 
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Dorado,’103 leading to an exponential growth in the European population of the city, from 1,000 in 1907 
to 31,000 in 1914.104  
Dual Cities 
General Lyautey saw his role as Resident-General of the French Protectorate of Morocco as that of a 
benevolent dictator, who would gradually introduce technical modernity to his Moroccan subjects 
without destroying their social forms. He despised the parliamentarianism of French politics, and 
“sought to form a new administrative elite, above politics, concerned only with the long-range public 
good.”105 The urban planning legislation he passed in Morocco in 1914 reflected these views and was 
based on two principles: separation of native cities from new cities, and action by decree instead of by 
parliamentary legislation.106 The new laws “reflected a sense of normalizing urban processes under the 
labels of hygienic features, traffic management and so forth. This normalization became the precursor of 
ideas that would be applied by avant-garde modernists.”107 The separation of the colonial city from the 
medina was not just a “matter of conserving the native way of life” but also of separating the colonial 
districts from the “misery” of the medina.108 
After the 1907 invasion, the French started to build their new city to the southeast of the old medina. 
However, lacking a central plan, construction was random and diverse in terms of housing type and 
placement. As a response to the situation he observed in Casablanca in 1913, General Lyautey assigned 
the task of organizing the chaos of the city to Henri Prost.109 Prost’s planning style relied on a zoning 
103 Puschmann, 2011, p. 73 
104 Rabinow, 1989, p. 36 
105 Rabinow, 1989, p. 33 
106 Rabinow, 1989, p. 35; "[Lyuatey's urban planning] included one essential condition: the complete separation of 
European agglomerations from native agglomerations. The European population centers must be separated from 
those of the indigenous populations for political, economic, sanitary, and aesthetic reasons, as well as for town 
planning purposes" - Henri Prost in Royer, ed., L'Urabnisme aux colonies", quoted in Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 131. 
107 Radoine, 2012, p. 21 
108 Radoine, 2012, p. 25 
109 Puschmann, 2011, p. 54 
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framework, based on separation of functions but also of populations. The Ville Nouvelle he planned was 
intended only for Europeans.110 His plans called for three hospitals for three clienteles—civilian 
Europeans, the French military, and natives111—as well as other public buildings using Beaux Arts 
placement, but native North African forms, or at least the European interpretations of those forms 
employing a neo-Mauresque style first developed in Tunisia.  
As the European city in Casablanca grew, it became “a new dominant structure to which the pre-
existing cities became increasingly subordinate,” reducing the Moroccans “to the status of a submissive 
partner, from whom resources, both material and human, were to be extracted.”112 
With the native population rapidly expanding, but limited in development opportunities by the 
growth of the European city, Prost suggested building a new medina two kilometres away from the old 
one.113 The new quarter was built using modern technical infrastructure beneath a neo-Mauresque 
façade, however, “the houses lacked basic needs like private toilets and even kitchens.”114 The policy of 
separation of populations is best exemplified in a social urban experiment conducted in Casablanca—the 
construction of a new and separate prostitution district, with internal segregation of European, Muslim, 
and Jewish prostitutes. The rationale and design of the district were ostensibly based on principles of 
public health and hygiene, but Driss Maghraoui argues that it was in effect both a prison and a 
brothel.115 
Despite Prost’s intentions for a separation of populations, the uncontrollable growth of populations 
and speculative development, coupled with a general disdain for his zoning policies, meant that there 
110 Puschmann, 2011, p. 55 
111 Rabinow, 1989, p. 39 
112 Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 151 
113 Rabinow, 1989, p. 41 
114 Puschmann, 2011, p. 56 
115 Rabinow, 1989, p. 43; Maghraoui, 2008 
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was no distinct separation of populations, and in fact there was widespread mixing.116 This trend 
conforms to other historic attempts at racial segregation, including in Spanish-American colonial cities in 
the 16th century, Portuguese “fortified factories” throughout their African and Asian colonies, Spanish 
Philippines, as well as British colonial outposts in Ireland and India. These segregationist attempts were 
never fully successful at separating populations, and the colour lines they tried to impose were always 
semi-permeable. 117  What they did succeed in, though, was in creating an “instrument in 
institutionalizing what became a color hierarchy.”118 The colour lines thus created also helped 
implement a distinction in the allocation of public facilities, exemplified in French Morocco with 
Moroccans getting a fraction of the facilities that the European quarters received, but most importantly, 
in terms of allocation of space for growth.119 120  
As opposed to a separation dictated from above and largely ignored below, the situation in Jaffa was 
one in which the separation was wanted by a segment of the Jewish population that would have to 
struggle both against the Turkish authorities and other Jews in order to implement its vision. In 1906, 
sixty prominent Zionists from Jaffa founded a society called Ahuzat Bayit [Hebrew for housing estate] for 
the purchase of land and the construction of homes in the Jaffa region. In its first meeting, the society’s 
goal was described as the “founding of a new Hebrew” settlement, though “the word modern soon 
replaced new; that is, the goal quickly became defined as establishing a ‘modern Jewish urban 
neighbourhood in a European style in the city of Jaffa’.”121 Among the motives for the creation of a new 
settlement, much like the motivation behind the creation of previous new Jewish neighbourhoods, was 
the desire to alleviate overcrowding within the old city. However, the new neighbourhood differed from 
116 Prost’s plan for a cordon sanitaire around Casablanca’s medina could not be implemented because of decades 
of European land speculation in the city (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 147). 
117 Nightingale, 2012, pp. 50-65 
118 Nightingale, 2012, p. 65 
119 Rabinow, 1989, p. 44 
120 Janet Abu-Lughod argues that “Rabat was the most successful exemplar of French 'dual city' planning in 
Morocco. In Casablanca, the 'native' original was too truncated, the foreign additions too undisciplined, and the 
pace of development too frantic to permit adequate control" (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 155). 
121 LeVine, 2005, p. 61 
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those earlier neighbourhoods in that it also had nationalist settler-colonialist motives: There was a 
desire to segregate new immigrants from the indigenous Arabs “in a place where they could nurture 
their national values by speaking Hebrew, developing Hebrew educational and cultural institutions, 
engaging in national activities, and the like;” there was also a desire to “stem the flow of Jewish capital 
into Arab hands through renting Arab houses;” and finally, there was a desire “to bolster Jewish national 
prestige as a prelude to raising the Jews’ political status.”122 Besides stemming the flow of capital to 
Arab landowners, the new suburb was also seen as a way of circumventing the Arab monopoly on 
agricultural trade.123  
The establishment of Ahuzat Bayit was also viewed as a way for Jews to escape the unhealthy and 
crowded conditions of the city, reminiscent of the crowded Jewish ghettos of Europe.124 The previously 
built Jewish neighbourhoods were seen as replicating the crowded and unsanitary conditions of the 
main city.125 The new neighbourhood, partly financed through a loan by the Jewish National Fund (JNF), 
would have to conform to planning standards set by JNF officials. The Palestine director of the JNF, 
Arthur Ruppin, was asked to formulate the neighbourhood regulations and in order to do so ordered the 
latest writings on urban planning, including Ebenezer Howard’s ‘Garden Cities of Tomorrow.’126 The 
building regulations in the new neighbourhood would conform to those in force in European cities, as 
based on Stuebben’s Handbuch der Architektur.127 When finally built, beginning in 1909, the houses 
were designed by Jewish and Christian architects on an individual rather than uniform basis, and 
122 LeVine, 2005, p. 61 
123 Katz, 1986, p. 406 
124 In a passage of his book, The Hebrew National Fund, Zionist leader Yehiel Tschlenow justified a loan to Ahuzat 
Bayit by the Jewish National Fund thus: “It is with a feeling of some bitterness that we point out how Zionism 
found a way of life for itself in Palestine as unhealthy as that in the ghettos of the diaspora. The immigrants 
transferred the life of the ghetto to Palestine—the urge to live close together and the contempt for air and space, 
trees and flowers, which deformed the bodies of the Jews. To your surprise you see there the very image of what 
you see in London's Whitechapel, in the Moscow Zhidiya and in the Judengasse in Vilna.” Katz, 1986, p. 411 
125 Katz, 1986, p. 405 
126 LeVine, 2005, p. 63 
127 Katz, 1986, p. 412 
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conformed to a Western style, similar to that employed in a nearby German colony, and lacking any 
traditional local elements.128  
The members of Ahuzat Bayit were themselves familiar with the notion of the garden suburb, and its 
bourgeois and cultural values suited their needs and aspirations, as they were all middle-class 
professionals, most of them recent European immigrants. Howard’s emphasis on land and a return to 
the soil were especially suited to the similar Zionist ideals, which had previously only found expression in 
rural agricultural settlements.129  
As revealed by the minutes of one of the housing association’s earliest meetings, it was declared that 
the new suburb was to be:  
a Jewish urban centre in a healthy spot, beautifully arranged and ordered according to 
all the rules of hygiene, so that instead of the mire and filth of Jaffa would be found a 
quiet place among trees with pure air.130  
The early meetings also dealt with the exclusivity of the suburb, which was to be “100% Hebrew,” and 
this decision would later be enshrined in the suburb regulations, which “forbade selling or letting houses 
in Tel-Aviv suburb to Arabs.”131 132 
Though the new suburb was to be exclusively Jewish, it was also to be secular and modern. As 
opposed to French planning policy in Casablanca, which relied heavily on the construction of public 
facilities, the only public building called for in the initial plans for Ahuzat Bayit was the Hebrew 
128 Katz, 1986, p. 413 
129 Katz, 1986, p. 408 
130 Katz, 1986, p. 408 
131 Katz, 1986, p. 408 
132 At the time, Hebrew could refer both to the language and to the Jewish religion. In a discussion on observing 
the Sabbath in Tel-Aviv, the adherents of Rabbi Kook demanded that his formulation on observance be entered 
into the town’s constitution: “In all of Tel-Aviv's territory, as a Hebrew city in the Land of Israel, the religious 
holiness of the Sabbath has a legal civil validity as far as public display is concerned.” (Tel-Aviv Municipal Archives 
[TAMA], 206/10-02, p. 3 of Protocol 33, 07/05/1923.) In addition, there was an interest in promoting the use in Tel-
Aviv of the Hebrew language, as would be enshrined in the town’s by-laws, which required anyone running for 
town council to know the Hebrew language (TAMA, 207/10-01, p. 8). Another reasoning for the use of Hebrew 
could be explained by the idea of the Negation of Exile, where Hebrew is used to refer to the New Jew, the strong 
Jew who has returned and is connected to his land, as opposed to the old, Exilic Jew of the European Ghetto or 
Shtetl (Piterberg, 1996, p. 131). 
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Gymnasium (high school), named in honour of the father of Zionism, Theodore Herzl. No plans were put 
in place for a synagogue, which was a staple of other Jewish neighbourhoods in Palestine.133 
Growth of the new suburb was rapid, with 50 houses intended to house 500 residents completed in 
1909, 116 houses and 980 residents by the end of 1912, and 204 houses and approximately 2,000 
residents by the eve of the First World War (see Figure 1). In 1910, the name of the suburb was changed 
from Ahuzat Bayit to Tel-Aviv,134 and in the same year its planning functions were taken over by the Tel-
Aviv Committee, which maintained the policies of its predecessor.135 Physical growth was achieved by 
purchases of land by the committee and by Zionist land-purchasing companies, and through unification 
with other associations and suburbs (which popped up following the success of Tel-Aviv). Tel-Aviv grew 
from an initial 85.5 dunums136 to 570 dunums on the eve of World War I. Land purchases were 
intentionally made along a corridor leading to the seashore, with the aim of outflanking the northern 
Jaffa neighbourhood of Menshieh (Manshiyyeh) to both halt the further spread of Jaffa to the north, and 
to give the new suburb access to the sea and unrestricted northward expansion possibilities (see Figure 
1).137 In 1913, Jaffa’s older Jewish neighbourhood of Neve Tzedek asked to merge with Tel-Aviv and was 
granted approval by the latter conditioned on the former’s conforming to its strict sanitary conditions.138 
133 Katz, 1986, p. 409 
134 LeVine, 2005, p. 72 
135 Katz, 1986, p. 413 
136 Turkish land area measurement unit, 1 dunum=~1,000 square meters 
137 Katz, 1986, p. 414 
138 LeVine, 2005, p. 72 
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 Figure 1 - The built up area of Tel-Aviv in relation to Jaffa on the eve of the First World War. Source: Survey of Egypt, June 
1918, (as cited in Katz, 1986, p. 413) 
As Tel-Aviv grew, its city council came into conflict with the Jaffa Jewish council over whom would 
represent the Jewish population of Jaffa, a conflict that would continue well into the British mandate 
period.139 This Antagonism between the Jewish communities of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa also included class 
antagonism, as Jaffa’s growing Jewish working class was resentful of the new city’s growing attraction 
for upper class and professional immigrants, while “to the workers’ chagrin, facilities for ‘the people’ 
had yet to be built.”140 
Early Land Speculation 
Land speculation in Morocco was observed in the Rabat area as early as the 1860s, when the small 
minority of locals from Salé (a twin city to Rabat) who could mobilize capital began to buy up property 
and to lend money to others. Though no similar documentary proof is available for Casablanca at the 
time, it can be imagined that the pattern observed in conservative and insular Salé would have been at 
139 LeVine, 2005, p. 50 
140 LeVine, 2005, p. 51 
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least repeated if not expanded in more open Casablanca141. Right after the 1907 French invasion, real 
estate speculation in Casablanca became a major problem. As Europeans immigrated to the relatively 
safe occupation zone, their dreams of riches were confronted with the reality that there was no gold or 
oil in this new El Dorado, and their main avenues to riches were land speculation and commerce. 
Despite a legal restriction on European ownership of land, Europeans invested heavily in real estate with 
the expectation that France would officially take over and legalize their investments. Moroccans also 
joined in the speculation, and “land prices rose by as much as 600 times”.142 Some land in the city centre 
would change hands purely for speculative reasons long into the 20th century, leaving empty spaces 
while the city continued to expand further and further out, in many cases in the form of shanty towns 
built by poor rural migrants who could not afford land prices in the city proper.143 This speculative 
activity would end up making the city “a random terrain, unsuitable for any master plan.”144  
In some cases, land speculation took the form of outright fraud, following the introduction of the 
Australian Torrens Act system of land registration in 1913. The new system required registration of land 
plots in special rosters, so that “each property [was] cleanly and distinctly delimited on the ground 
under a name and number in a particular order, with the proper topographic and juridical 
determinations, and with a definitive and precise statement as to its owner.”145 Indigenous land owners 
were often reluctant to register their land under a French system that would require them to submit to 
French rather than to religious courts. Consequently, land transactions were open to fraud, and 
"foreigners began to register in the [rosters] land that they had not actually purchased, or had 
purchased from someone who did not really own it; and to register doctored deeds which included 
larger areas or more rights than they had purchased.” Though there was an appeal process, the window 
141 Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 87 
142 Rabinow, 1989, p. 36 
143 Puschmann, 2011, p. 56 
144 Radoine, 2012, p. 20 
145 Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 164 
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of appeal was short, and the registrations were published in French only. As a result, many native land 
owners lost their titles, and the only recourse they had when they found out was to fight the decision in 
a French court, which was tilted in favour of the colonists.146 
Between 1910 and the outbreak of World War I, much of the land surrounding Tel-Aviv had been 
purchased by Jews or was already in the hands of Jewish land brokers. So much land had been 
purchased by 1912 that a debate developed over the necessity of buying further land outside of the 
already built neighbourhood, with the realization that the land purchases were leading to rampant 
speculation. In order to combat speculation, the ‘Syndicate for Purchasing Land’ was set up in 1914 in 
order to buy land in the vicinity of Tel-Aviv that could be disposed of in an orderly manner.147 However, 
Abraham Granovsky, a JNF land specialist, would later blame the municipality’s own land policy for 
supporting speculation.148 When asked by the new British Governor in 1919 about suspicion of land 
speculation in Tel-Aviv, the town committee replied that it knew of no speculation.149 The next year, 
though, the council approved the purchase of land recently bought by a Mr. Bersky, but limited his profit 
to 10% “to avoid speculation.”150 For the next year, the issue of land speculation and ways to combat it 
recurred in council meetings.151 When a proposal to set up another land syndicate to combat 
speculation was brought up, one of the councillors raised the question of how to maximize the profits of 
the syndicate, indicating that perhaps the council’s understanding of what constitutes speculation was 
limited.152 Land speculation in Tel-Aviv is cited as a reason for its rapid growth from a neighbourhood to 
a city, as well as for exacerbating rather than relieving the housing problem of Jews in Jaffa.153 Since 
Zionism depended on the maximal control of territory under an initially hostile government, though 
146 Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 165 
147 LeVine, 2005, p. 73 
148 Kallus, 1997, note 9 
149 TAMA, 282/1, p. 232, Council Protocol, 1 October 1919 
150 TAMA, 283/1, Council Protocol 39, 8 December 1920 
151 TAMA, 283/1, various Council Protocols, including Protocol 11, 19 February 1921; Protocol 15, 10 March 1921 
152 TAMA, 206/10-7, p. 2, Council Protocol 28, 21 February 1925 
153 LeVine, 2005, p. 73 
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speculation might have hampered the city economically and presented a barrier for poorer residents, it 
could be said that it served the city’s grander colonial purpose. For example, when a tax on undeveloped 
land was proposed to combat speculation, one member of council raised the fear that Jewish 
landowners might fictitiously transfer ownership to Arabs in order to avoid the tax, and that he would 
prefer that the land remain under Jewish ownership rather than be transferred.154 
Under Ottoman rule, land registration had begun to take hold, but was far from complete. 
Restrictions on Jewish purchases of land were circumvented by using middlemen, or by holding a 
separate, independent land registry for each settlement, in which transfers of land would be 
recorded.155 After the establishment of the British Mandate, the system of land surveying and 
registration was expanded through the 1928 Land Settlement Ordinance, also based on the Torrens Act. 
The settlers’ land registries would be recognized by the new system and incorporated into it.156 
The Physical and Social Place of ‘Internal Others’ 
Ethnic segregation in Morocco in general, and Casablanca in particular, was hardly a French invention. 
Before the French invasion, the Jews of Casablanca lived in their own quarter, the Mellah, though unlike 
in other Moroccan cities, this quarter was not walled off, so that sometimes Jews lived next to Muslims 
on the same street or even in the same house. The Jewish population was extremely poor overall, with 
some members living in tents or the city’s first bidonvilles [shantytowns].157 After the French invasion of 
Casablanca, Jews formed a substantial part of the internal migration to that city, so that by the eve of 
the Second World War, 44% of Morocco’s Jews resided in Casablanca. A small minority of Jews in 
Casablanca “became integrated in the modernisation process [the city was undergoing] while the rest 
154 TAMA, 206/10-7, p. 4, Council Protocol 33, 29 March 1925 
155 In October, 1916, in preparation for the arrival of an Ottoman commission tasked with investigating land sold to 
foreigners, the Tel-Aviv council decided to remove and hide all of the plans that were in the building (TAMA, 282/1, 
p. 29). 
156 Gavish & Kark, 1993, p. 78 
157 Rabinow, 1989, p. 37 
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were estranged from it and lived in its margins.” Many of the immigrants crowded into the already 
overcrowded Mellah, which soon became a slum.158 
Unemployment in the Jewish quarter in the early-20th century was high, but this would change as 
more Jews immigrated to Casablanca and their children enrolled in professional and primary schools 
established by the Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU). The AIU was a Paris-based organization 
established in the mid-19th century with the purpose of advancement of Jews of the Middle East through 
the logic of mission civilisatrice.159 As more and more Jewish youths enrolled in AIU schools, the latter’s 
graduates were increasingly employed in new and modern professions.160 By 1936 approximately a 
quarter of the Jews in French Morocco were literate in French, and the first Moroccan inhabitant of 
Casablanca to qualify as a doctor was a Jew.161 Pre-colonial establishment of AIU schools in Morocco 
was assisted by French (and other European) Consuls, who viewed the Jews of Morocco favourably, for 
they considered “the Jews, more than the Muslims, as a potentially progressive element in the 
population who could serve European interests in the pre-colonial period.”162 However, once the 
protectorate was established, the French authorities were reluctant to enrol Jewish youths in schools 
intended for Europeans, thinking that “most Jews would remain loyal to France in any case, with or 
without receiving any educational and political privileges.”163 Thus the protectorate was interested in 
having the Jewish community act as an intermediary population, but was unwilling to allow it the social 
mobility that would enable full integration within the new regime. Attempts to naturalize Moroccan 
Jews as French citizens, largely spearheaded by the AIU, repeatedly failed, with Protectorate authorities 
unwilling to grant citizenship to the Jews for several reasons, most of them consistent with the policy of 
158 Srougo, 2011, pp. 77-78 
159 Burrows, 1986, p. 121 
160 Srougo, 2011, p. 87 
161 Pennell, 2000, pp. 250-251 
162 Laskier, 1994, pp. 28 
163 Laskier, 1994, p. 29 
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association rather than assimilation.164 In fact, despite the partial integration of the Jewish population 
into the colonial apparatus, the majority of Jews remained poor and disenfranchised, and it was these 
poor elements that would become fruitful ground for Zionist recruiters from the 1930s on.165  
Janet Abu-Lughod identifies Morocco’s Jews under the protectorate as occupying a “'caste' position 
ambiguously attached both to the older indigenous system of production and distribution and to the 
foreign system.” A majority of the Jewish labour force were employed in industry and trade, but largely 
in smaller-scale artisanal operations.166 
In Jaffa, the Jewish population at the turn of the century included an established Sephardi 
community, as well as a quickly growing Ashkenazi community. Though there was a lively debate within 
the established Sephardi community about Zionism and its dangers, many prominent members of the 
community continued to actively participate in land purchases for settlement, as well as act as ‘straw 
men’ after Ottoman regulations restricted land sale only to Ottoman subjects. 167, 168 While Zionism 
concentrated on European Jewish immigration to Palestine, which interestingly, for Herzl, included 
Algerian Jews who had become French citizens in 1870 under the Cremieux decree169, early in the 20th 
century a need arose for cheap Jewish labour to replace Palestinian labour. To fulfill this need, two 
thousand Yemenite Jews were recruited by Ashkenazi Zionist Shmuel Yavne’eli between 1910 and 1914. 
However, soon after their arrival they were deemed unsuitable workers and expelled from most Jewish 
settlements. Zionist leaders of all camps saw these non-Ashkenazi Jews as a threat to the Zionist project 
and stressed the importance of physical separation.170 This separation can be seen in the development 
of streets and neighbourhoods of distinct ethnic composition in Tel-Aviv (including a Yemenite quarter 
164 Laskier, 1994, pp. 169-170 
165 Pennell, 2000, p. 252 
166 Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 219 
167 This division and the debate will be explored in Chapter 2. 
168 Campos, 2005, p. 475 
169 Laskier, 1994, p. 32 
170 Massad, 1996, pp. 54-55 
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that predated Yavne’eli’s recruitment effort),171 and in the economic, political, and cultural exclusion 
suffered by Yemenite and Mizrahi Jews in Tel-Aviv, where “the Ashkenazi majority imposed its standards 
and conventions in many areas.”172 Yemenite workers were excluded from employment in Tel-Aviv to 
such an extent that as late as 1936 the Histadrut—the main Zionist labour organization—admitted that 
it was not doing nearly enough to help Mizrahi workers.173 As the city grew and attracted new 
immigrants, its southern neighbourhoods, those adjacent to Jaffa, would become slums, mostly 
populated by Middle Eastern and North African Jews.174 
The physical and social position of the internal others in early Tel-Aviv needs to be explored further, 
as most literature on the subject of Mizrahi Jews in Israel deals with the period following the creation of 
the state. Though there are sporadic references to them (as in the reference by Golan, above), their role 
and place in the creation of the new city and in its relation to its Arab progenitor deserve deeper inquiry.  
Conclusion 
Both Casablanca and Tel-Aviv developed in the early 20th century as colonial outgrowths of native 
towns, and though the aim of the French in Casablanca was the implementation of colonization by 
association, and that of the Zionists in Tel-Aviv was for colonization by dissociation, both developments 
followed similar patterns. In both cities, the colonists used the relatively new profession and language of 
town planning to attempt to rationalize and differentiate the new suburbs from the old city. The use of 
planning, with its emphasis on health and hygiene, was seen as a modern response to what ailed both 
the local medina and the European cities the planners left behind. However, as both cities quickly grew 
in population, rampant speculation in land quickly followed, hampering continued orderly growth, and 
leading to rapid territorial expansion and the creation of slums. Though similarities in both cases 
171 Helman, 2011, p. 136 
172 Helman, 2011, p. 141 
173 LeVine, 2005, p. 98 
174 Golan, 2002, p. 121 
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abound, it is important to also stress the differences between them, whose source, in my opinion, is in 
the two divergent logics of colonialism and settler-colonialism. 
This paper touched on only a few aspects of the two cities, but leaves room for future inquiry into 
unexplored or underexplored aspects, such as the economic development of the dual cities; the 
modernist aspects of the two new cities; an exploration of the two master plans developed for the cities 
by Prost in Casablanca and Geddes in Tel-Aviv; architectural styles—neo-Mauresque in Casablanca, 
International/Bauhaus in Tel-Aviv; and a deeper exploration of the place of the internal other in both 
cities. 
Most importantly for my research purposes, in both cities an internal other social group was used as a 
physical as well as social buffer between the dominant colonial group and the previously dominant local 
population. In Casablanca, some of the Jewish population was partly assimilated into the French culture 
and economy through special schools supported by the authorities. In Tel-Aviv, poor Middle Eastern 
Jews were used as precarious labour to replace local Palestinian labourers, while more economically 
established Middle Eastern Jews were used as land agents and straw men to facilitate land purchases. 
The next chapter will deal with the space and place of internal others in Tel-Aviv in more depth. 
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Chapter 2: Urban Segregation in Early Tel-Aviv 
“FATHER, Mother, and Me  
Sister and Auntie say 
All the people like us are We, 
And every one else is They. 
And They live over the sea, 
While We live over the way,  
But - would you believe it? - They look upon We  
As only a sort of They!” - Rudyard Kipling, We and They 
 
“The question, of course, is how the individual got to be in this ‘social role’, and how the particular social 
organization (with its property-rights and structure of authority) got to be there. And these are historical questions. 
If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude 
of experiences. But if we watch these men over an adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in their 
relationships, their ideas, and their institutions.” – E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 10 
Introduction 
During a Tel-Aviv Council meeting held on 9 February 1921, dealing with the question of annexation 
of nearby Jewish neighbourhoods, council member Dr. Theodor Zlocisti recommended that the 
communities in question be annexed even against their will, stating that the council had “a cultural 
mission, and therefore must influence those who are resistant to European culture, especially in matters 
of health, so that we may cure the bad places, and we ourselves have an interest in thus forcing them 
for the interest of our own health.”175 Zlocisti had only recently arrived in Palestine from Germany176, 
but he was not the first to rely on sanitation and health as an excuse for urban policy in Palestine, or 
indeed in Tel-Aviv. Itzhak Khayutman, in his memoirs, wrote that the idea for a separate Hebrew 
neighbourhood in Jaffa formed in his head in 1905, when he became the agent for the Singer sewing 
machine company in Jaffa. Among the reasons he cited for the new neighbourhood were the “clean and 
175 Tel-Aviv Municipal Archives [TAMA], 422/283b, pp. 185-186 
176 Obituary in Jewish Telegraphic Agency [JTA], 1943, retrieved from http://www.jta.org/1943/12/28/archive/dr-
zlocisti-veteran-german-zionist-dies-in-palestine 
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healthy air” the residents would be able to breathe, as well as a distancing from the “moral corruption 
that was worse than the actual stench” of Jaffa. He further lamented that “the daily proximity of our 
children to the sons of our neighbours, who from childhood are used to express profanity and immoral 
expressions of all types, has done harm to the education of our children, which was no less hard on 
them than the harm to their health.”177 The notion of racial moral corruption among Jaffa’s Arab natives, 
tied to degraded sanitation, was not a novel one at the time, having originated at least half a century 
earlier in British colonial discourse regarding the Indians of Calcutta and in Atlantic discourse regarding 
Africans.178 
The establishment of the first Jewish neighbourhood outside of Jaffa, Neve-Tzedek, was also justified 
on the grounds of sanitation and health, but it did not share the same claim to the moral superiority of 
its residents over the moral degeneracy of the natives. In Neve-Tzedek’s book of regulations, the 
reasons cited for the creation of the new neighbourhood were the crowded living conditions within 
Jaffa, the rising housing prices, as well as the need for fresh air.179 In their vision, Neve-Tzedek’s 
founders saw a clean and well-planned neighbourhood with straight and clean streets and sidewalks, 
and though they would be considered narrow by later standards, at the time they were considered 
broad and spacious.180 The residents of this and the other new Jewish neighbourhoods that would soon 
follow continued to view themselves as an inseparable part of Jaffa.  
In his book chronicling the history and development of urban segregation, Carl Nightingale identifies 
three institutions that were instrumental at first to the implementation of segregation in Calcutta, but 
later to replicating segregationist ideas and practices worldwide: the administration of a modern 
177 Shchori, 1990, p. 21 
178 Nightingale, 2012, pp. 85-86, 125; “In India...concerns about white racial survival and race mixture fused with 
early Victorian beliefs about gender, age, and class. The Anglo-British elite increasingly imagined the hill 
stations…as 'cradles of the ruling race'...places where white women could keep their moral purity and health and 
British children could grow up without losing any of their ruddy-cheeked Anglo-Saxon racial vigor to the sapping 
torpor of the lowlands” (p. 125). 
179 Droyanov, 1936, p. 30 
180 LeVine, 2005, p. 156 
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colonial empire, networks of intellectual exchange among professional scientists and urban reformers, 
and a multi-continental market in urban real estate.181 It is my intention in this chapter to show that the 
early leaders of Tel-Aviv, initially lacking the first institution and later using that of the British Mandate in 
Palestine, were able to use the other two institutions to effect an urban segregation of their growing 
city. Arabs were excluded from residence in the city from its very beginnings,182 and attempts were also 
made to prohibit Arab workers from involvement in its early construction. I will also venture to show 
that within the Jewish community itself there was a segregationist drive to separate those Jews of 
European origins (Ashkenazi) from those of Asian, African, and Balkan origin (Sephardi) as well. 
I will first elaborate on the conceptual categories that divided the Jewish population in Palestine and 
the world at the time of Tel-Aviv’s founding, and still do today though some of the terminology has 
changed. I will then attempt to show that Zionism, and Tel-Aviv as its urban flagship, were (and still are) 
settler-colonial projects, and as such exhibited the traits of a settler-colony, as elaborated by Lorenzo 
Veracini. I will finally touch on Zionist Orientalism and how it affected attitudes of the early Zionists 
toward the Palestinian Arabs and toward their Sephardi co-religionists, and how the Zionists viewed 
themselves within its framework, before moving on to the main topic of the chapter, segregation in Tel-
Aviv. 
Sephardim and Ashkenazim – Conceptual Origins of the Terms 
The Jewish world at the end of the 19th century was divided into three main groups: Mizrahi (literally, 
Eastern) Jewry—those Jewish communities that trace their history to the Babylonian exile of Jews from 
historic Judea in the sixth century BCE, and who congregated in modern day Iraq and Iran and from 
there spread to the Arabian Peninsula and South, Central, and Eastern Asia. This group, sometimes 
referred to as Oriental Jews, also includes those Jews who migrated at the same time to Egypt, and from 
181 Nightingale, 2012, pp. 5, 75 
182 Katz, 1986, p. 408 
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there to other parts of the eastern Mediterranean; Sephardic (from the Hebrew word for Spain – 
Sepharad) Jewry, which includes those Jews who lived in the Iberian Peninsula, first under Roman rule 
and subsequently under Christian and Muslim rule. Following the Reconquista of Spain and the 
expulsion edict by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella in 1492, this group was forced to either convert to 
Christianity or to leave Spain (and in 1497, Portugal). This expulsion saw the Sephardic communities 
spread around the Mediterranean, including lands of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, Turkey, and 
North Africa, as well as the independent Moroccan Empire, where they mixed with the existing Oriental 
Jewish communities. In addition, small groups migrated to parts of Western Europe as well as the New 
World; and Ashkenazi Jewry, which descended from Jews who settled in the Rhine River Valley and 
northern France during the late Roman era and subsequently moved to Eastern Europe following a 
series of expulsion edicts and the persecutions that accompanied the Crusades. From its founding until 
the modern era, Ashkenazi Jewry “developed and matured solely within the context of Christian-
majority culture.”183 
The main division between these groupings, as suggested by Bernard Lewis, is between those Jews 
who lived under the strict religious edicts of Christendom (Ashkenazi) and those Jews who lived under 
the generally more tolerant rule of Islam (Sephardi and Mizrahi). Due to the intolerant environment in 
which they lived, Ashkenazi Jewry turned inward and developed stricter religious observances, while 
Oriental and Sephardi Jewry, living under more tolerant conditions, was more open to cultural and 
intellectual exchange with its surroundings,184 and held more permissive religious views. Though the two 
groups follow the same basic religious tenets, they hold different outlooks and customs, including 
liturgical and ritual differences.185 
183 Zohar, 2005, p. 6 
184 For example, one of the most highly regarded Sephardi religious scholars, Maimonides, was also a philosopher 
and physician (Zohar, 2005, p. 9). 
185 Zohar, 2005, Ch. 1 
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Zionism as Settler-Colonialism 
As theorized by Lorenzo Veracini, settler-colonialism is distinct from colonialism.186 Whereas the 
latter refers to exogenous domination of an indigenous population, space, and economy, the former 
additionally refers to a permanent movement and reproduction of communities.187 And whereas in a 
colonial situation, the indigenous population is necessary and integral for the survival and success of the 
colonial project, in the settler-colonial situation, as defined by Patrick Wolfe, the indigenous population 
is dispensable, for “the primary object of settler-colonization is the land itself rather than the surplus 
value to be derived from mixing native labour with it.”188 One of the central characteristics of the 
settler-colonial situation is settler control over the population economy of the colonized land.189 To this 
end, a dynamic system of relationships is established between three different agencies: the settler 
colonizer, the indigenous colonized, and a variety of exogenous others. The settler colonizers attempt to 
dominate and control this system of relationships, and to progressively make the indigenous and 
exogenous others disappear in a variety of ways, including extermination, expulsion, containment, and 
assimilation.190  
Another central characteristic of settler-colonialism is a specific consciousness developed by the 
settlers, in which the colonizers develop a certain perception of their situation and a number of 
paranoiac dispositions.191 These include disavowal, the settler gaze, the primal scene, and screen 
memory. In disavowal, the settlers disavow any violence they necessarily inflicted on the indigenous 
population in order to gain control of territory, for any gain of territory by the settlers is ultimately 
based on the de-territorialization of the indigenous population. Though they disavow any founding 
violence, representing the country as empty and the settlement as peaceful, the settlers nonetheless 
186 Veracini, 2006, p. 2 
187 Veracini, 2006, p. 3 
188 Wolfe, quoted in Veracini, 2006, p. 8 
189 Veracini, 2006, p. 12 
190 Veracini, 2006, p. 16 
191 Veracini, 2005, p. 75 
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fear revenge.192 The settler gaze is the tendency of settlers to depopulate the country of indigenous 
peoples in representations and to perceive the land as empty.193 The primal scene, a concept borrowed 
from Freud, refers to the first time that a child sees its parents engaged in sexual intercourse. This 
painful acknowledgement of an origin that is not perfect, often leads to denial of this origin, as discussed 
above regarding disavowal. In a settler-colonial situation, the primal scene may refer to the ‘discovery’ 
not only of an indigenous other, but also of exogenous others, which may include previous settlers.194 
Screen memory, another Freudian term, refers to an inaccurate reconstruction of actual events in order 
to obscure what really happened, and a disregard of history that preceded the arrival of the ‘first’ 
settlers.195 
In terms of the settler population economy, if we look at the early history of Zionism and Zionist 
immigration and colonization of Palestine, we can see clear instances of control of and manipulation of 
the population economy. Even before the advent of political Zionism, in 1839, British philanthropist Sir 
Moses (Moshe) Montefiore commissioned a census of the Jewish population of Palestine. Montefiore 
was influenced to commission this and subsequent censuses following the implementation of the census 
in England in 1801 and civil registration in 1837. 196 At the time, Montefiore’s activities in Palestine were 
limited to direct financial support of the Jewish population, which was largely dependent on 
donations197 from diaspora Jews, though less than two decades later he would begin to support 
settlement activity, including purchasing land outside of Jaffa in 1855.198 These land purchases, 
192 Veracini, 2005, p. 81 
193 Veracini, 2005, p. 82 
194 Veracini, 2005, p. 87 
195 Veracini, 2005, p. 90 
196 Feldman, 2007, p. 1. The censuses are available online at http://www.montefiorecensuses.org/ 
197 Haluka in Hebrew 
198 Today’s Montefiore neighbourhood in Tel-Aviv 
50 
 
                                                          
however, were still for philanthropic purposes, as they were meant to support Jewish families already in 
Palestine, and the profits from them were meant to support Jewish scholars.199 
During World War I, the Palestine Zionist Office conducted a census of the Jewish population for 
welfare and research purposes. In 1924, the Jewish Agency for Palestine established a Department of 
Statistics, which conducted yearly estimates of the Jewish population as well as several censuses in 
1927, 1936, 1941-42, and a comprehensive survey of the Jewish population in 1944 that included 
detailed analysis of immigration, demographics, and natural growth of the Jewish population. In 1925, 
the Tel-Aviv municipality conducted its own survey, and in 1938 the Jewish community in Haifa did the 
same.200  
In the 1930s, the Haganah [Defence], the illegal paramilitary arm of the Jewish Agency, together with 
the Jewish National Fund, began conducting a survey of all of Mandatory Palestine’s villages, including 
detailed mapping using aerial photography, as well as detailed statistics of the male population, the 
name and occupation of residents, the clan membership and political affiliation of the residents, as well 
as their economic class.201  
Before the establishment of the state of Israel, the Zionist organizations could not control who 
entered or left Palestine, but as far as recruiting individuals to the Zionist project, they were very 
selective of certain groups.202 When Yemenite workers were brought to Palestine by Zionist 
functionaries in the first decade of the twentieth century, those selected for importation were chosen 
for characteristics that would make them good agricultural workers, in what Ella Shohat has called 
“quasi-eugenic selection,” which would be repeated for Moroccan immigrants shortly after the 
establishment of Israel.203 Furthermore, once they were in Palestine, they were prevented from 
199 Halevy, 1976 
200 Bachi, 1976, pp. 402-403 
201 Pappe, 2006, pp. 19-20 
202 Bloom, 2007, p. 341 
203 Shohat, 1988, pp. 14-15 
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participation in land ownership or membership in cooperative settlements, thus relegating them to the 
role of wage-earners. 
As far as a specific settler consciousness, early and later Zionists exhibited many of the perceptions 
and paranoiac dispositions elucidated by Veracini. Land purchased from absentee Arab landlords was 
depopulated from its peasant Arab population by the JNF, leaving it with no source of subsistence. 
Though it was done legally, there is an inherent violence to this depopulation, especially when it is done 
punitively, on lands that the new owners have no intention of cultivating.204 Then of course, there is the 
much larger-scale depopulation of the Nakba, when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were 
removed from their homes and not allowed to return.205 In both cases, the Zionist narrative relies on the 
legality of the eviction or the personal choice of the Palestinians to flee despite the exhortations of the 
army commanders. However, even if the latter were true, the fact that they were not allowed to return 
and their land subsequently became the property of the Israeli state tells the lie of these claims.  
The early settlers of Tel-Aviv were experts at the settler gaze, portraying the early days of their town 
as existing within a sea of empty sand dunes, while in fact they were surrounded by cultivated land and 
already existing settlements and neighbourhoods, both Jewish and Arab (as well as two German 
colonies).206 This is also an example of screen memory, whereby Tel-Aviv’s official narrative is that of the 
original Jewish neighbourhood outside of Jaffa, embodying some sort of special pioneering essence that 
drew all of the neighbourhoods that would follow it and that preceded it to it, when in fact, it was 
mostly its abundant water supply that made it so attractive and gave it such power over its 
neighbours.207 
204 Pappe, 2006, p. 18 
205 Pappe, 2006 
206 LeVine, 2005, ch.5; Rotbard, 2015, pp. 43-50, 74-75 
207 The protocols of Tel-Aviv council meetings in the first two decades of the twentieth century are full of 
references to the city’s water supply, and its sale to other neighbourhoods, including threats of cutting off the 
water supply as a sanction against non-compliance with Tel-Aviv’s regulations; Droyanov also elaborates on the 
power the fledgling town exerted over its neighbours through its water supply (1935, p. 209, note 2). 
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The primal scene is best exemplified by the case of Kvutzat Kinneret, one the first Zionist communal 
settlements in Palestine.208 Established in 1913, it is celebrated for its pioneering spirit and as a symbol 
of the young settlement’s Zionist idealism. Yet a group of Yemenite Jews had arrived at the same spot in 
1912, and though at first they coexisted for a few years, after seventeen years the pioneers were able to 
evict their Yemenite predecessors, forcing them to move to another part of the country entirely and 
erasing them from the settlement’s narrative. When asked in a documentary movie about this eviction, 
several of the Kvutza members profess that it was done for the Yemenites’ own good, as they had no 
proper housing and many of them died during those pioneering years.209 Today, the Yemenite settlers 
are completely absent from the narrative of the Kvutza, and the only testament to their presence is in 
the settlement’s cemetery.210 
Zionist Orientalism 
Though the term Sephardim originally referred to Iberian Jews, by the end of the 19th and early-20th 
centuries it had come to include all non-Ashkenazi Jews. This was a reflection both of the historical 
influence Spanish Jews had on Jewry in the Ottoman Empire and Morocco, as well as an indication of 
Ashkenazi Orientalism.211 As Zionism took hold in Europe toward the end of the 19th century, it 
developed an “obvious Orientalist dimension.”212 Zionism adopted the Orientalist dichotomy, seeing 
itself and the modern Ashkenazi Jewry that it represented as an enlightened West, opposed to a 
backward, though sometimes romantically idealized, Oriental Jewry (as well as seeing itself in opposition 
to the old, exilic European Jewry). For example, Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, a Russian Zionist credited with the 
revival of Hebrew as a spoken language, though he had a complex and often oppositional relationship 
208 Kvutza – Hebrew for group; the predecessor to the Hebrew term kibbutz, Hebrew for grouping. 
209 Feige, 2011, pp. 179-180 
210 The documentary film “The Unpromised Land” traces the history of this settlement and expulsion, 
http://www.amythosmedia.com/projects/films/the-unpromised-land/. 
211 Cohen, 2005, p. 36 
212 Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, p. 166 
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with Palestine’s Sephardic community, chose to use the Sephardi Hebrew accent prevalent among the 
Jews of Palestine rather than the Ashkenazi accent of Europe. This decision stemmed in part from the 
Zionist concept of “negation of exile,”213 which saw Zionists as the ‘new Jews’ as opposed to the exilic 
Jews of Europe, but also from the (mistaken) belief that the Sephardic pronunciation was closest to that 
used by biblical Jews.214 To the early Zionists, the act of immigration to Zion215 was seen as 
transformative, regenerating the exilic Jew, perceived in Orientalist terms as backward and static, into 
the ‘new Jew’.216 By leaving Europe and the self-image of the exilic Jew behind, Zionists paradoxically 
moved to the Orient in order to join the Christian West. In their perception they came to an empty land, 
in order to transform and redeem it, and through it, redeem themselves. Though they were aware of 
the existence of a native population, including centuries old Jewish communities, their negation of exile 
easily translated into a negation of the inhabitants of their new home, through the same settler gaze 
described above. In this negation the native population was viewed in Orientalist fashion as an essential 
group embodying either a romanticized, idealized antiquity, or a violent and irrational backwardness. In 
either case, it was not the Arabs themselves that the Zionists were willing to incorporate into their 
settler project, but only their image, and even that only to a limited extent. 217 Thus the first Jewish 
fighters of the Yishuv [settlement],218 the members of HaShomer [the guard], a group that would hire its 
members out as guards for Jewish settlements, adopted the attire of the Arabs, including the kafiya, 
abaya, and native weapons and accessories.219 By appropriating the traditional garb of the natives, or 
rather a hybrid of Eastern European, Cossack, and Bedouin attire, the settlers were in essence replacing 
213 Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, pp. 166-167 
214 Cohen, 2005, p. 37 
215 Zion was one of the many names of Jerusalem in Jewish tradition, and Zionists saw their immigration to 
Palestine as an act of ascension to Zion, their biblical homeland.  
216 Raz-krakotzkin, 2005, p. 167 
217 Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, pp. 168-169 
218 “The Hebrew reference to the Jewish society of Palestine from the 1880s to 1948” (Zerubavel, 2008, p. 316). 
219 Zerubavel, 2008, p. 325 
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the natives and making them superfluous.220 The members of HaShomer were trying to take over guard 
duty from the Arab guards who were traditionally employed by the settlements, in an oft repeated 
attempt of replacing Arab labour with ‘Hebrew’ labour. 
While the native Arabs could be excluded and dispossessed by the settlement project, the Zionists 
could not do the same to the native Jews and Jewish immigrants from the Muslim world. Seeing and 
advertising itself as a redemptive movement for world Jewry, they had to incorporate the Mizrahi Jews 
into their project. However, in order to be incorporated, the Mizrahi Jews had to integrate, shedding 
their traditions and culture and adopting the Western culture of the Zionist elite, which was seen by the 
latter as modern and universal.221 The attitude of the Zionist establishment and of the European Jewish 
immigrants toward the Mizrahi Jews was not consistent throughout the period of colonization. At first it 
was an attitude of romantic admiration to what was viewed as an authentic tradition, as seen in the 
adoption of the Sephardi pronunciation of the Hebrew language, and in the description of the Yemenite 
Jews as the ‘authentic Jews’. However, in time this attitude shifted to one of ridicule and contempt, and 
forced shedding of any ‘authenticity.’ I believe, though I have found no sources to conclusively 
substantiate this claim, that as long as Zionism was operating under Ottoman rule, European immigrants 
were forced to view the East and its inhabitants with some semblance of respect, as they were 
themselves subjects of the East in Palestine. Once Ottoman rule was replaced with British rule, these 
immigrants could shed any Oriental attire and consciousness, and re-adopt European ones. However, 
even in this case, they would deny their own ‘eastern backwardness’222 and adopt the Ashkenazi 
identity, which originally was reserved for German Jewry only. 
220 Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, p. 169 
221 Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, p. 171 
222 Eastern European Jews were looked at with contempt by the Jews of Germany and Northern France, which in 
Hebrew came to be known as Ashkenaz. The Eastern Jews of Poland, Lithuania, and Russia would derisively be 
called by the ‘true’ Ashkenazi Jews as Ostjuden–Eastern Jews–well into the twentieth century. (Elazar, 1984, p. 
149). 
55 
 
                                                          
Segregation in Early Zionist Thought and Action 
In reference to Zionism as a segregationist movement, Carl Nightingale notes that Zionism embraced  
Many of the same currents of thought and institutional forces involved in urban 
segregation elsewhere in the world. Early Zionists freely mixed secular ideas about 
racial hierarchy, the dangers of assimilation and crossbreeding, and providential claims 
to 'natural' homelands with such biblical ideas as the chosen people, the long exile, and 
the Promised Land.223  
Arthur Ruppin, who formulated Tel-Aviv’s original regulations based on the technical writings of, 
among others, Ebenezer Howard, was a great believer in eugenics, and theorized and wrote about it 
extensively.224 Before his immigration to Palestine, Ruppin worked at and ultimately headed the Bureau 
of Jewish Statistics in Berlin, whose aim was to curb Jewish assimilation and fight anti-Semitism in 
Germany using statistical data.225 During his time in the Bureau it collected and organized the first bank 
of data of Jewish statistics and demography, which would become the basis for numerous negotiations 
concerning the Jews in the 20th century, and a “crucial step in the unification of the Jews as a modern 
nation represented by the Zionist movement.”226 In his book Jews of the Present, Ruppin asserted that 
throughout their history, Jews were able to preserve their racial purity through religious observances 
that prevented assimilation. Once the Jews began secularizing, the future of the Jewish nation was in 
danger of annihilation, and the only remedy Ruppin saw for that was Zionism. He further asserted that 
the leaders of the Jews throughout history were not only religious leaders, but “first and foremost 
physicians and administrators—the equivalent of modern medical authorities and sanitation officials—
whose task was to preserve the physical and moral health of the Volk [German for people or nation], a 
223 Nightingale, 2012, p. 412 
224 Bloom, 2007; Morris-Reich, 2006 
225 Bloom, 2007, pp. 337-338 
226 Bloom, 2007, p. 338 
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position that Ruppin would very soon assume in the newly emerging Jewish Volk.”227 In order to 
preserve the Jews, Ruppin thought that he must transform the Jews through a long process of biological 
improvement, beginning with discouragement of racial mixing through intermarriage, which 
“weakened…the ‘race character,’” and by “[preserving] Jewish separatism.”228 By concentrating in 
separate, closed communities and promoting a new Jewish culture based exclusively on the East-
European Jewish culture, Ruppin believed that he could thus preserve the physical and moral health of 
the Volk. Thus we see that segregation was central to Ruppin’s eugenics planning.229 
Also central to Ruppin’s theories was the belief that the Jews were descended from non-Semitic Indo-
Germanic tribes, who, once they mixed with what he called Semitic Bedouin blood, lost their touch with 
the land and developed an “uncontrollable mercantile instinct,” thus becoming the proverbial 
wandering Jews.230 Ruppin located the pure, original Jews as being from Eastern Europe, and asserted 
that the Sephardic and Oriental Jews were unsuitable for eugenic regeneration because they carried 
Semitic elements. He further asserted that they were in a process of “biological degeneration” and were 
inferior to Ashkenazi Jews “in all fields.”231  
Through his position as founder and head of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization in Jaffa, 
Ruppin had considerable influence over both land acquisition and settlement activity, and Zionist 
immigration policy. As we saw in Chapter 1, Ruppin formulated Ahuzat Bayit’s first set of building 
regulations and also had considerable influence and control over Kvutzat Kinneret discussed previously. 
Though it is possible, as Amos Morris-Reich argues,232 that Ruppin was able to separate his racial ideas 
from his administrative role, it is far more likely that they affected the myriad critical decisions that 
Ruppin made throughout his career as one of the Yishuv’s chief planners and administrators. 
227 Bloom, 2007, pp. 338-339 
228 Bloom, 2007, p. 339 
229 Bloom, 2007, p. 339 
230 Bloom, 2007, p. 340 
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232 Morris-Reich, 2008, p. 118 
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As mentioned before, Nightingale asserts that urban racial segregationists depended on three 
institutions to promote their ideas: “governments, networks of intellectual exchange, and the 
institutions associated with the modern capitalist real estate industry.”233 Though the early Zionists 
lacked a government, and worked within the sometimes hostile Ottoman administration of Palestine, 
they were quick to set up separate governing institutions for the growing Yishuv in Palestine. Pre-Zionist 
Jewish society in Palestine (the Old Yishuv) had communal organizations and institutions, but these were 
local community organizations responsible for the local affairs of the Jewish community, with little 
coordination between them. After political Zionism was established in the late 19th century, 
international and national institutions were set up to direct and coordinate settlement efforts,234 though 
local institutions, either transformed or newly made, still retained a central role in decision making.235 
The Zionist Organization, founded in 1897 by Theodore Herzl and holding annual or biannual congresses 
until 1913, was one such institution, which in turn was responsible for the foundation of other 
institutions. The various Zionist Congresses passed resolutions that would found other institutions to 
provide the framework upon which organized colonial settlement activity could proceed. Following the 
second congress, a bank was incorporated in England in 1899, whose subsidiary, the Anglo-Palestine 
Bank, established in Jaffa in 1903,236 would be instrumental in funding future settlements, including Tel-
Aviv. The fifth congress established the Jewish National Fund (JNF), tasked with collecting money 
exclusively for the purchase of land in Palestine and Syria.237 Ruppin’s opening of the Palestine Office of 
the Zionist Organization in Jaffa in 1908 marked the beginning of that organization’s systematic work in 
233 Nightingale, 2012, p. 5 
234 Until the middle of the 20th century’s first decade, the Zionist organizations, both in Palestine and abroad, 
actually worked to deter immigration in order not to overburden the Yishuv and sponsoring bodies, and not to 
raise the ire of the Ottoman authorities (Shilo, 1994). 
235 Robinson Divine, 2000, pp. 265-266 
236 Lehn, 1974, p. 77 
237 Lehn, 1974, p. 78 
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Palestine, which included instigating settlement activity and providing information to prospective 
immigrants.238  
The members of the Zionist Organization were described as young professionals, fresh out of 
university, and representing the same group that Theodor Herzl described in his utopian novel 
Altneuland as “an unfortunate surplus of trained men who could find no work, but were at the same 
time spoiled for a modest way of life. They could not, like their Christian colleagues, slip into public 
posts.”239 Some of these young men were trained in the same professions that would prove crucial for 
earlier segregation efforts in colonial empires: medicine, law, and engineering. They included Ruppin, a 
trained lawyer; Zlocisti, a physician who wrote a book about climatology and pathology in Palestine,240 
and co-wrote a book on the organization of healthcare in Palestine with the Zionist Organization’s 
construction engineer in Palestine, Richard Michel;241 and Pinhas Rutenberg, an engineer instrumental in 
the design and implementation of hydraulic resources in Palestine for irrigation and electricity 
production. All three would play important roles in the creation and expansion of Tel-Aviv.  
The pioneering technocrats of political Zionism in its first two decades were largely from Central 
Europe, and adapted mainly Central European models to Zionist concerns,242 though they were highly 
influenced by British town planning as well. Many of Zionism’s earliest activists took inspiration from the 
garden city movement in England. Theodor Herzl, in his 1896 book The Jewish State, suggested building 
“detached houses in little gardens…united into attractive groups,” while rejecting contemporary 
European worker housing as “miserable rows of shanties.”243 Arthur Ruppin, when formulating the 
building regulations for Ahuzat Bayit, consulted the works of Ebenezer Howard, among others.244 
238 Shilo, 1994, p. 607 
239 Quoted in Berkowitz, 1993, p. 16 
240 Klimatologie und Pathologie Palästinas, 1937 
241 Aufgaben und Organisation des Sanitätsdienstes in Palästina, published in 1920 (Harpaz, 2013, p.53nn19). 
242 Penslar, 1991, p. 42 
243 Herzl quoted in Harpaz, 2013, p. 19 
244 LeVine, 2005, p. 63; Katz, 1986, p. 412 
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Architect Alexander Levy, who made many proposals for public and private construction in Palestine, 
also incorporated the garden-city concept into his plans, though only as one of several different types of 
housing.245 Levy, who applied for, but was rejected from, positions with the Palestine Office of the 
Zionist Organization, went on to found an organization in Berlin, the Association of the Builders of the 
Land of Israel, with the support of the Association of Jewish Architects and Engineers. The goal of the 
new association was to “resolve the problem of building and housing in Palestine” ahead of planned 
mass immigration, and in this capacity it dealt with research, planning, and advocacy.246  
Though Herzl was an Austrian, in his formulation of political Zionism in The Jewish State, the financial 
institutions he proposed would be “subject to English jurisdiction, framed according to English laws, and 
under the protection of England” with their center in London.247 Though he provides no reasoning for 
this location, London at the time was the centre of a world-spanning colonial empire, with all of the 
necessary institutions for a colonial undertaking already headquartered there, as well as being a centre 
of knowledge of colonial matters.248 As Nightingale says, Zionism’s “earliest successes stemmed from its 
leaders' meetings with one of the foremost figures of segregation mania, British colonial secretary 
Joseph Chamberlain, and his senior colleague, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Arthur James 
Balfour.”249  
In the early years of the 20th century, several real estate companies formed in Palestine and abroad 
for the express purpose of purchasing land in Palestine. Some of these companies were motivated 
purely by nationalistic sentiments and were not intent on making a profit, while others, though 
motivated by Zionism, were premised on profit-making. In 1908 the Palestine Land Development 
245 Harpaz, 2013, Ch. 4 
246 Harpaz, 2013, p. 34 
247 Herzl, 1896 [1989], p. 15 
248 In his 1919 book, The History of Zionism, Nahum Sokolow wrote that “All the great achievements of British 
peaceful conquests encouraged the Zionist Movement with its trusts and funds. Cecil Rhodes, with only a million 
pounds to start with, created Rhodesia with its 750,000 square miles. The British North Borneo Company has a 
capital of £800,000 and dominates over 31,000 square miles…” (Sokolow, 1919, p. xlvii) 
249 Nightingale, 2012, p. 413 
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Company was established in London, and started operating two years later under the leadership of 
Arthur Ruppin. The company’s methods borrowed from German colonization methods in Posen, in 
which land was systematically purchased out of the hands of Polish landowners and transferred to 
German settlers in order to change the province’s demographic balance.250 Another company, the Geula 
[redemption] Society, was set up in 1902 by the Hibat Zion [love of Zion] organization, headquartered in 
Odessa, Ukraine.251 The motivator for the founding of the company, and its first secretary, was Meir 
Diezengoff, who would later be instrumental in Ahuzat Bayit’s formation, and would become Tel-Aviv’s 
first and long-standing mayor. The motivation for the founding of the company was the economic 
recession Palestine experienced in the late-19th and early-20th century, the sources of which were 
determined to be a lack of land for expansion of settlement and a reliance by settlers on handouts from 
abroad instead of on productive work. The Odessa Council therefore decided that it should cease 
financial support of individuals and shift its resources to land purchases. However, since the Council’s 
resources were meager, it was decided that it would act as a facilitator for private capital investment in 
land in Palestine. The Council was also fearful of large-scale land purchases in Palestine by European 
capitalists, as its importance as a potential transportation hub had drawn wide interest in the territory, 
and German capitalists had indeed already started purchasing lands there in 1901-1902. Another 
motivation for the founding of the society was the recent decision by the Zionist Organization to found 
the Anglo-Palestine Company Bank (known by the Hebrew acronym AFEK) in Jaffa, as it was assumed 
that as an English registered bank, AFEK could facilitate the purchase of land under Ottoman 
restrictions. 252 
250 Reichman & Hasson, 1984, p. 61 
251 Hovevei (or Hibat) Zion—Hebrew for lovers (or love) of Zion. Hibat Zion was a Zionist organization of Russian 
and Romanian origin, largely motivated by the 1881 pogroms against Jews in Russia that followed the assassination 
of the Tzar, and by the deteriorating condition of the Jewish communities of Romania following its independence 
in 1878 (Katz, 1988, pp. 63-64). 
252 Katz, 1987, pp. 5-10. 
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Another such company was the American Zion Commonwealth Inc. (AMZIC), which was established in 
New York in 1914 for the purpose of purchasing land in Palestine to aid settlement and to secure for its 
“members and their descendants rights, interests and privileges in lands occupied” by the company.253 
American Zionists would play an important role in the policy shift of the JNF in 1920 that would see, in 
addition to JNF funds acquired philanthropically, a concurrent use of private capital for the development 
of Palestine. ‘Public’ money provided by the JNF would be used to improve the infrastructure, built and 
human, which in turn would “ensure more conducive conditions for investment.”254 
By the 1920s, we know that real estate and homeownership in Tel-Aviv were a lucrative business. 
From the minutes of a 1927 council meeting we learn that 500 landlords owned approximately 10,000 
rooms in the city, and that close to 3,000 houses are owned by absentee landlords.255 Though at least 
the latter number is debatable, as Droyanov puts the total number of houses in the city in 1927 at 
3,281,256 the fact that two councilors raised the issue during a meeting dealing with an acute housing 
shortage and high rents shows that the housing stock in the city was already by then used to extract 
profit on a large scale.  
Segregationist Tendencies in Early Tel-Aviv 
In the founding of Tel-Aviv, we find the convergence of the three institutions mentioned by 
Nightingale and expanded on above. The idea for a separate quarter based on health and hygiene, 
whose planning would be based on European standards and ideals; supported by various Zionist quasi-
governmental organizations, including a bank founded specifically for the settlement of Palestine; on 
land purchased with the help of one of the first real-estate companies in Palestine.257 
253 Glass, 2002, pp. 181-182. 
254 Glass, 2002, p. 183. 
255 TAMA, 207/10-03, Minutes of 18th council meeting, 22 June 1927, pp. 181-182. 
256 Droyanov, 1936, p. 323. 
257 Geula Society provided a substantial loan for Ahuzat Bayit Society’s purchase of the Kerem Jabali lands, with the 
land itself standing in assurance of the loan (Katz, 1987, p. 100). 
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Of the first Jewish neighbourhoods outside of Jaffa, several were of mixed Ashkenazi-Sephardi make 
up, while others were strictly Yemenite. Neve-Tzedek (established in 1887), the first neighbourhood, 
was of mixed residency and ownership.258 It was built by a public company, Ezrat Israel, whose original 
aim was to provide Ashkenazi immigrants medical and financial assistance, but which soon turned to 
settlement activity and consequently neglected its aid mandate.259 The second neighbourhood, Neve-
Shalom (established in 1890), was built by a private real-estate developer, Zerah Baranet, and was also 
of mixed ethnicity.260 Land purchases in the Jaffa environs for settlement purposes expanded following 
the establishment of these two neighbourhoods, peaking in 1891. The same year saw the establishment 
of many real-estate companies, mostly by private entrepreneurs for profit, but some by cooperatives 
strictly in order to fulfill the housing needs of groups and individuals.261 However, the next Jewish 
neighbourhood would only be established in 1896. This neighbourhood, Yaffe Nof, was also of mixed 
ethnicity, as attested by its regulations.262 Next to be built was the Akhva neighbourhood, built by ultra-
orthodox Ashkenazi residents of Jaffa in 1899. Mahane Yehuda was built in 1903, and was composed 
entirely of Yemenite Jews, who built mostly windowless hovels, with a few stone structures interspersed 
in them. Mahane Yosef and Ohel Moshe were built in 1904, by a mixed population of Yemenite, North 
African, and Ashkenazi Jews.263 1906 saw the establishment of the last Jewish neighbourhood before 
Ahuzat Bayit; later to be known as Kerem HaTeimanim, but at the time known as Mahane Yisrael, or 
Kerem Karton,264 the neighbourhood was also of mixed populace, though Yemenite Jews formed an 
overwhelming majority. 
258 Ram, 1996, p. 128 
259 Ram, 1996, pp. 99-100. 
260 Ram, 1996, pp. 128-129. 
261 Ram, 1996, p. 130. 
262 Ram, 1996, pp. 132-133. 
263 Ram, 1996, pp. 134-135. 
264 Kerem HaTeimanim – Hebrew for Yemenite Vineyard. Kerem Karton – Cardboard Vineyard, a reference to the 
building materials originally used in its construction. 
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We see then, that by the time Ahuzat Bayit’s council was formed in 1906, several Jewish 
neighbourhoods had existed outside of the Jaffa walls, and most of them had a mixed ethnicity. Ahuzat 
Bayit, though it also had several members from Jaffa’s established Sephardi families, was mostly an 
Ashkenazi association, and later, neighbourhood. Its members were mostly businessmen who preferred 
to keep their capital invested in their businesses, and therefore sought a large loan with a low interest 
rate to pay for the land and for construction costs.265 Their association coincided with the establishment 
by Arthur Ruppin of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization, whose first initiative in Palestine 
was securing approval for the aforementioned loan from the heads of the Zionist Organization in 
Europe.266,267 As opposed to previously built neighbourhoods that considered themselves inseparable 
from Jaffa, “The creation of a separate community, a hallmark of the Zionist movement, did not occur in 
Jaffa until Tel-Aviv’s founding.”268 
The next neighbourhoods to be built outside of Jaffa would already follow in the footsteps of Ahuzat 
Bayit, including applying for loans under the same conditions from the Zionist Organization, parceling 
land into similarly sized lots, and using modern land planning regulations modeled on Ahuzat Bayit’s.269 
Nahalat Binyamin [Benjamin’s bequest] merged with Ahuzat Bayit, by then renamed Tel-Aviv, in 
1912, 270 after discovering that the neighbourhood had no ready supply of water.271 Following the same 
265 Letter dated 23 June 1907, from Ahuzat Bayit Council to the Jewish National Fund main office in Cologne, 
Germany, quoted in Droyanov, 1936, p. 75. 
266 Ram, 1996, p. 238. 
267 Ruppin saw the work of his office as “being similar to that of the Colonization Commission working in Posen and 
Western Prussia. The JNF will buy land whenever it is offered by non-Jews and will offer it for resale either partly or 
wholly to Jews.” (Reichman & Hasson, 1984, p. 61). The Posen Commission’s mandate was to transfer land 
ownership in German-occupied Posen to German landowners. Reichman & Hasson point to the similarities 
between Zionist colonization of Palestine and the Prussian colonization of Posen. 
268 Ram, 1996, p.85, note 7 
269 Ahuzat Bayit’s original planning regulations, formulated by Arthur Ruppin, called for maximum lot coverage of 
30% (Droyanov, 1936, p. 157). The Tel-Aviv planning regulations, adopted in 1910, already allowed coverage of 
33% of lots (Droyanov, 1936, p. 161). Nahalat Binyamin, the first neighbourhood built after Ahuzat Bayit, allowed 
construction on 40% of lots (Droyanov, 1936, p. 195). However, once the two neighbourhoods were joined, 
Nahalat Binyamin agreed to adopt Tel-Aviv’s regulations going forward. 
270 LeVine, 2005, p. 72 
271 Ram, 1996, p. 241; Droyanov, 1936, p. 180 
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model, other neighbourhoods were built and soon joined Tel-Aviv, including Hevra Hadasha [new 
society] in 1912 and Merkaz Ba’alei Melakha [craftsmen’s centre] in 1913.  
When in 1913 the older Jewish neighbourhood of Neve-Tzedek asked to be connected to Tel-Aviv’s 
water supply, the latter agreed to do so, but in the process “took it upon itself to educate its neighbour 
at the least about good order,” including clauses in the water supply contract forcing Neve-Tzedek to 
pave its streets and install sidewalks, install outhouses and cesspools, clean its streets and lawns and 
remove garbage from the neighbourhood on a daily basis, and forbidding the drying of underwear in 
plain sight of the streets.272 In case any of these clauses was not kept, after an initial warning, Tel-Aviv 
maintained its right to cut off the water supply for any further infringements.273 Similar water-supply 
contracts were subsequently signed with other neighbourhoods that were not part of Tel-Aviv, including 
Merkaz Ba’alei Melakha and Kerem HaTeimanim, in both cases forcing these neighbourhoods to comply 
with Tel-Aviv’s current and future land-planning ordinances.274  
During World War I, the city’s development was halted and its residents expelled by the Ottoman 
authorities. The end of the war saw a shift from Ottoman to British rule, which markedly affected the 
growing city. Before the war there was discussion of building a great synagogue, with the Tel-Aviv 
council proposing a large hall for Sabbath and High Holiday observances, and two smaller adjacent halls 
for weekday observances, one for Ashkenazi liturgy and one for Sephardi liturgy. However, following 
discussion it was decided to build a single great hall, with a committee composed of nine Ashkenazi and 
one Sephardi members appointed to put the plan into action.275 The war put a halt to plans for the 
synagogue and when it was finally completed in 1926, it was to be an Ashkenazi synagogue, which the 
Jaffa-Tel-Aviv Sephardi chief Rabbi already knew in 1924, when he petitioned for funds from the Tel-Aviv 
272 Droyanov, 1936, pp. 198-199 
273 For a full year after the signing of the agreement Tel-Aviv’s council refused to connect Neve-Tzedek to its water 
supply, only relenting once the latter’s residents started complying with the planning and sanitation regulations 
stipulated in the agreement (Droyanov, 1936, p. 199). 
274 Droyanov, 1936, pp. 209-210. 
275 Droyanov, 1936, p. 201. 
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municipality for a Sephardi synagogue. The town’s deputy mayor responded, suggesting that Tel-Aviv 
was a unified Jewish city where “all Jews are equal” and therefore he should find a way to pray at the 
Great Synagogue, which “did not belong to any particular ethnic community.” Thus, though in its earliest 
years Tel-Aviv purported to be a home for diverse Jewish communities, it soon became one in which the 
dominant Ashkenazi community set the tone to which the other communities had to conform. In the 
end, a Sephardi synagogue was built with municipal help, though this came about only after the city’s 
Sephardi residents refused to pay the special construction levy meant for the great synagogue.276 
Once the war ended, growth of the city and its surroundings was renewed. In 1920 the Tel-Aviv 
council declared that all those who purchased lands surrounding Tel-Aviv must conform with certain 
planning regulations; those who did not would not be provided water from Tel-Aviv’s water sources, and 
their lands would be formally disavowed by the council.277 At the same meeting, a suggestion was made 
to negotiate with the “Yemenites living around Tel-Aviv” about trading their houses and lands for land 
near the sea, “by which we will order and fix the whole area of Tel-Aviv.”278 However, two weeks later it 
was decided in principle that these lands and their residents should be amalgamated with Tel-Aviv.279 
During a February 1921 meeting discussing the amalgamation there was disagreement within the 
council over whether these neighbourhoods should be persuaded to join Tel-Aviv or whether they 
should be allowed to decide for themselves. It was at this meeting that Dr. Zlocisti made the statement 
that opened this chapter, about forcing these neighbourhoods to join Tel-Aviv as part of a “cultural 
mission.”  
Following an Arab assault on Jews in Jaffa in May 1921, which saw many casualties on both sides, 
though more so on the Jewish side, and an influx of Jewish refugees into Tel-Aviv, the Mandate 
authorities decided to grant Tel-Aviv Township status, which would see it gain semi-independence from 
276 Helman, 2011, pp. 140-141 
277 TAMA, 422/283A, pp. 38-39. 
278 TAMA, 422/283A, pp. 40-41. 
279 TAMA, 422/283A, no page number.  
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Jaffa. During the border negotiations following this decision it was decided that those neighbourhoods 
with Jewish majorities would be included in Tel-Aviv, including Neve-Tzedek, Neve-Shalom, Mahane 
Yosef, Mahane Yehuda, Ohel Moshe, and Kerem HaTeimanim. However, actual amalgamation would be 
delayed by several years, as the residents of these neighbourhoods demanded proportional 
representation within the Tel-Aviv council280 as well as the preservation of neighbourhood autonomy.281  
After amalgamation, these neighbourhoods, and particularly Kerem HaTeimanim, complained of 
continued neglect of their needs by the Tel-Aviv municipality. In a meeting in 1925, a Yemenite member 
of the council complained of discrimination in the city’s schools, saying that teachers refused to allow 
Yemenite children into class, claiming that they are sick, and estimating the number of children thus 
affected to be approximately 200.282 Earlier that year, another councilor complained that on Allenby 
Street, which borders on the Yemenite quarter, houses of six stories were allowed, while in the latter 
not even two stories were allowed; “We are being surrounded by a fort,”283 he stated. A 1926 letter 
from the Kerem HaTeimanim neighbourhood council to the acting mayor of Tel-Aviv complained of 
continued neglect of street cleaning, street lighting, and security in the neighbourhood.284 In 1927 one 
council member complained of a lack of paved roads and electric lighting in Kerem HaTeimanim and 
Neve Sha’anan, while new roads were being paved in new neighbourhoods in the city’s north.285,286 In 
1938, the residents of Kerem HaTeimanim wrote a letter to the Tel-Aviv municipality complaining of 
years of neglect, with their meagre taxes being diverted to the richer neighbourhoods of the north while 
they had been left in the same state they had been in for 15 years (since joining Tel-Aviv): “The noise 
280 During a council meeting on 21 May 1921 a Yemenite representative requested that representatives from the 
Yemenite neighbourhoods (Mahane Yosef, Mahane Yehuda, Kerem HaTeimanim) be appointed, but the council 
decided that no new arrangements will be made, though neighbourhood representatives will be invited to all 
important meetings between the council and committee (TAMA, 422/283B, p. 255). 
281 Ram, 1996, p. 341. 
282 TAMA, 206/10-02, protocol no. 10 dated 17 October 1925, no page number. 
283 TAMA, 206/10-07, protocol no. 26 dated 24 January 1925, p. 4. 
284 TAMA, 1065/2207A, letter dated 15 July 1926. 
285 TAMA, 207/10-02, p. 118.  
286 Complaints about lack of lighting in the Yemenite Quarter were also raised in 1924 (TAMA, 206/10-06, protocol 
no. 12 dated 30 August 1924, no page number). 
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and the filth, the density and the noise all are here, only roads are lacking, sewers are lacking, 
improvements are lacking, only taxes and taxes, trials and payments, fines and an emptying out.”287 
Another indication of the status of Yemenite residents in the city can be gleaned from a council meeting 
in 1924, when 29 participants are listed by name, while the end of the roll call lists “3 Yemenites”, 
without providing their names.288 A year later, complaints of discrimination against Yemenites by the 
Tel-Aviv Electoral Committee prompted a boycott of elections by Yemenites throughout the Mandate 
territory.289 
In 1924, the Jewish neighbourhood of Neve-Sha’anan was also amalgamated into Tel-Aviv. The 
neighbourhood was built in 1921, on land purchased with the help of the Geula land company and the 
Tel-Aviv municipality,290 by a group of 400 Jews, both new immigrants and internal refugees who fled 
the violence in Jaffa the same year. They were proud of their mixed population, including nearly a 
quarter who were Yemenite and Sephardi, and envisaged their neighbourhood to be a mix of town and 
village, hoping to supply Tel-Aviv with at least part of its food by growing crops on their land.291 
However, this neighbourhood, which was on the opposite side of the railway tracks from the rest of Tel-
Aviv, was envisioned by the city to be an industrial area, as attested by the city’s chief planner in a 1940 
report to British town planner Patrick Abercrombie, ahead of his planned arrival in the city as a 
consultant.292 In the report, Yaacob Ben-Sira (Shifman), who was the city’s chief planner from 1929 to 
1950, asserted that “for many years past we had hoped that the south-eastern part of Tel-Aviv known as 
Neve-Shaanan might become such a light-industrial area.” A year after writing the report the 
287 Bernstein, 2008, p. 58. 
288 TAMA, 206/10-04, protocol no. 61 dated 24 May 1924. Diezengoff opened the same meeting by welcoming a 
Dr. Henska as a distinguished guest, but made no mention of the Yemenite observers. Having read dozens of Tel-
Aviv council meeting minutes, this was the only case I saw in which participants were not named but rather given 
an ethnic designation. 
289 Robinson Divine, 2000, pp. 265-266. 
290 TAMA, 422/283C, protocol no. 55 dated 20 October 1921, p. 452. Rotbard gives the year of amalgamation as 
1927. 
291 Rotbard, 2015, pp. 142-144. 
292 TAMA, 1138/2605C, p. 4. The planned visit apparently never happened because of the war. 
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municipality constructed its central bus station in the neighbourhood, effectively cutting it off from the 
rest of the city, “hiding the neighbourhood behind a smokescreen of buses.”293 In the same report, Ben-
Sira writes on the possibility of developing Holon, a Jewish town to the south of Neve-Sha’anan, so as to 
provide Tel-Aviv with its industrial needs and housing for its working population, suggesting a class-
based segregationist drive by the city.294 
Neve-Sha’anan was the last southern neighbourhood to be joined to Tel-Aviv until the 1940s, though 
Jewish neighbourhoods continued to be built to the south. Future annexations were not possible for 
several reasons, including Jaffa’s reluctance to give up any more territory to Tel-Aviv. However, we must 
also consider Tel-Aviv’s reluctance to annex these neighbourhoods. In a special meeting of Tel-Aviv 
Council held on 19 December 1926, David Bloch, mayor of Tel-Aviv between 1925 and 1927, talked 
about a proposed change in the township’s constitution that would see its residents unable to vote in 
the Jaffa elections, a right they maintained after their initial separation from that city: 
 Understand, that just as we do not have the possibility of influencing the 
municipalities of Nablus or Jenin so long as we do not sit within their territory, the 
same is true for Jaffa, and we have no other recourse than to attempt to bring Jews 
from the diaspora, of which there are many, who will settle in these cities and in 
Jaffa.295 
Thus we see that Tel-Aviv’s leaders, while wishing to disengage from Jaffa, still wished to maintain 
influence over it, and to do this they needed the southern neighbourhoods to act as both a buffer and a 
Jewish colony within Jaffa’s territory.  
The new Jewish neighbourhoods that were built to the south had their own reasons to maintain their 
separateness from Tel-Aviv, chief among them were the lower taxes collected by Jaffa, or no taxes at all 
293 Rotbard, 2015, p. 146. 
294 TAMA, 1138/2605C, p. 6. 
295 TAMA, 207/10-01, p. 4. Emphasis added. Bloch goes on to say that there are enough Jews in the diaspora to 
possibly bring into and influence purely Palestinian cities such as Nablus and Jenin. 
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in at least one case: the Shapira Quarter, which was built in 1924 by Lithuanian-born American 
entrepreneur Meir Getzel Shapira. Shapira purchased a large tract of land in the Abu-Kabir orchards 
south of Tel-Aviv and east of Jaffa, to which he hoped to draw industrialists, claiming that the land was 
neither in Tel-Aviv nor in Jaffa, and therefore could not be taxed, nor its buildings regulated.296 In the 
end, he subdivided the land into small lots, less than half the size of standard lots in Tel-Aviv,297 and sold 
them to new immigrants from Bukhara (Central Asia), Eastern Europe, Turkey, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, 
Persia, and Thessaloniki (Greece).298 
The Florentine Quarter was built by Jews from Thessaloniki, Greece, in 1927, and they were soon 
joined by immigrants from Turkey, the Balkans, and Bukhara.299 It was built to the south of Neve-Tzedek, 
but within the boundaries of Jaffa, as a working-class residential neighbourhood with light industry. 
HaTikva Quarter was built in 1935 by Mizrahi Tel-Aviv municipal workers, on land to the southeast of 
Tel-Aviv, who were joined by Yemenite refugees from Tel-Aviv following the 1936 Arab uprising.300 
1925 was the last year of large-scale land purchases in the jurisdiction of Tel-Aviv until 1933.301 
Further expansion was largely limited by the cultivated lands of the German colony of Sarona to the 
east, and the Arab village of Sumayl, which was within Tel-Aviv’s jurisdiction. The same period saw the 
population of the city more than double, though it remained mostly stable between 1926 and 1930.302 
The last census of Tel-Aviv to include ethnic affiliation was conducted in 1925, and found that 98.8% of 
the population was Jewish, and of that, 85.4% was Ashkenazi, 7.7% Sephardi, 5.5% Yemenite, and 1.2% 
296 According to Shapira’s son, Nathan, his father could have had the neighbourhood annexed to Tel-Aviv, but 
preferred not to do so because of the city’s high taxes (Rotbard, 2009, no page number). 
297 The Shapira lots were a quarter of a dunum, approximately 250 sq. m. (Rotbard, 2009, 
http://readingmachine.co.il/home/books/1240134698 (Hebrew)). The Tel-Aviv lots were on average 588 sq. m. 
(Droyanov, 1936, p. 295). 
298 Rotbard, 2009, retrieved from http://readingmachine.co.il/home/books/1240134698 (Hebrew). 
299 “Don’t try to change Florentine”, 2008, para. 2.  
300 The Yemenite Quarters of Tel-Aviv were adjacent to the Jaffa neighbourhood of Manshiye and were partly 
evacuated following commencement of hostilities. By 1947 the HaTikva quarter is described by the Lydda District 
Commissioner as a “purely Jewish, mainly Yemenite, slum quarter.” (ISA, SF/10/39, p. 387). 
301 Droyanov, 1936, p. 296. 
302 Droyanov, 1936, p. 342. 
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“other Easterners.”303 Droyanov’s descriptions of Tel-Aviv in the mid-1930s shed some light on ethnic 
class divides within the city. In his description of the major intersection of Allenby, Nahalat Binyamin, 
HaCarmel, and Sheinkin Streets as a place of congregation of workers, he describes one side of the 
intersection as a gathering spot for male jobseekers, while the other side was occupied by female 
houseworkers, “an overwhelming majority of whom are of the Mizrahi communities.”304 The people 
observed on the sidewalks of the city’s business district along Herzl Street are described as brandishing 
hats and walking sticks, “typical stock-exchange people who are observed in every city, in which Eastern 
European Jews are present and involved in trade.”305 The upper end of HaCarmel Street bordering on 
Jaffa was (and remains) the city’s main market, where Arab and Mizrahi greengrocers had shops, and 
where “the spoken languages, and the shouts and faces of the vendors lend this corner the character of 
an eastern bazaar.”306 The market at the lower end of HaCarmel Street had “huts arranged in a 
European order and the vendors are all Jews, overwhelmingly Ashkenazi. The look is akin to that of a 
market in a modern Polish city.”307 Neve-Tzedek’s main street, Shabazi, had stores of two varieties, 
“Arab-Jewish and Eastern-European-Jewish, with the latter on the ascendancy. The Jewish vendor of 
Western Europe is still not seen here.” Ben-Yehuda Street, on the other hand, “has the appearance of a 
shopping street in a quiet suburb of a Western-European metropolis or one of the summer resorts next 
to the metropolis, such as Baden near Vienna.”308 The Yemenite Quarter was described as “the only 
neighbourhood of a special community.” Its small, hut-like houses were being replaced along Allenby 
303 Droyanov, 1936, p. 345. The distinction between Sephardi and Easterners is not explained, but likely means 
Persian, Central Asian, and Iraqi Jews. 
304 Droyanov, 1936, p. 316. 
305 Droyanov, 1936, p. 315. 
306 Droyanov, 1936, p. 316. 
307 Droyanov, 1936, p. 316. Droyanov distinguished this market from the noise and crowd that were the hallmarks 
of Jewish markets in the Pale of Settlement (a western region of the Russian Empire, encompassing part of Poland, 
to which Jewish residence was limited), thus marking Tel-Aviv as a modern European town, distinct from both Arab 
Palestine and from the Jewish Shtetl [village]. 
308 Droyanov, 1936, p. 316. 
71 
 
                                                          
Street by new houses, where Ashkenazi residents were beginning to insert themselves into the 
neighbourhood, and its “exotic poverty is facing extinction.”309 
Though there are no exact statistics for ethnic composition of the Jaffa neighbourhoods, we saw 
above that many, if not most of them were non-Ashkenazi. The explanation for this ethnic segregation is 
not simple and straightforward. We can assume that Jewish immigrants from Arab localities had a 
cultural affinity to Arab Jaffa more than they did to the mostly Ashkenazi Tel-Aviv, especially as 
European immigration to that city picked up pace following World War I. This would also include Jaffa 
residents, who after the 1921 Jaffa riots that resulted in the death of 47 Jews decided to leave Jaffa 
proper, but still wished to remain in its environs. However, residents of the Florentine Quarter, 
comprised mostly of Jews from Greece, would not have necessarily felt this affinity as they came from a 
non-Arab country, though one with recent Ottoman heritage. From correspondence in the 1940s 
between the “Joint Committee of Jewish Quarters in the Jaffa Area,” the Tel-Aviv municipality, and the 
National Council of the Yishuv, it appears that the former were unwilling to commit to any plan as 
regards retaining their semi-independent status under Jaffa, or annexation to Tel-Aviv.310 The higher 
taxes of Tel-Aviv meant that homeowners in these neighbourhoods refused to be annexed to that 
city,311 however, the lack of proper services (in the residents’ opinion), including education, caused the 
neighbourhood committees and residents to petition for unification in the 1940s.312  
The rise in Ashkenazi population in Tel-Aviv was accompanied by outspoken derision of Mizrahi 
culture, and the conflation of Ashkenazi culture with a new singular culture of the Yishuv. We have seen 
309 Droyanov, 1936, p. 318. 
310 TAMA, 4/2208D. 
311 Tel-Aviv’s residents paid almost 3.5 times as much in municipal taxes than Jaffa’s residents (Droyanov, 1936, p. 
398). 
312 This request, both by the Jewish quarters of Jaffa and by the Tel-Aviv municipality was repeatedly denied by the 
Mandate authorities. In a confidential letter from the Acting District Commissioner of Lydda District (to which Jaffa 
and Tel-Aviv belonged) to the Chief Secretary of the Mandate government dated 2 February 1946, the former 
admits that the inclusion of HaTikva within the Tel-Aviv Town Planning Boundaries would be the best solution to 
the problem of illegal construction in the quarter, but that he has rejected all such applications for political 
reasons. (Israel State Archives [ISA], SF/10/39, p. 331). 
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this in the case of Tel-Aviv’s Great Synagogue, and the attitude of the city’s deputy mayor. We have also 
seen the attitude of Dr. Zlocisti to “those who are resistant to European culture.”313 Another case is that 
of Ya’acov Rabinovitch, a prominent Ashkenazi intellectual, who in a 1913 article attacking a prominent 
Sephardi intellectual (more on this below) linked Sephardi Jews’ “’lack of culture’ with their affinities to 
Arab culture, defining this connection as a threat to Zionism,” with the only road “to becoming ‘one 
national division’” being the “erasure of Arab culture and enforced enculturation of European 
culture.”314 
In their article on pre-1936 Middle-Eastern Jewish intellectuals, Moshe Behar and Zvi Ben-Dor Benite 
show that “’European Zionist behaviour’” is revealed in the writings of Sephardi intellectuals in 
Palestine. Hayyim Ben-Kiki, a Tiberias-born scion of a distinguished Moroccan Jewish family, attacked 
the European leaders of the Zionist movement in a 1921 article. He accused them of arrogance and 
ignorance concerning the local Arabs, and a demeaning attitude towards Sephardic Jews.315 The latter’s 
awareness of European Zionists’ interest in “the Arab Question” resulted in their being “[disgraced] and 
[ridiculed] by the Yishuv’s prominent [Ashkenazi] men.”316 Thus, the 1913 advocacy by Sephardi 
intellectual Dr. Nissim Malul to include the study of Arabic as a compulsory subject in Hebrew-Jewish 
schools was described by Ya’acov Rabinovitch as an “internal threat,” and he further advised Yishuv 
members “to keep away from Arabised Jewish intellectuals who advocated for the cultivation of such a 
relationship.”317 
We must also consider the change from Ottoman to British rule in Palestine, and its effect on the 
attitude of Ashkenazi residents toward both the Palestinians and Sephardi Jews, including those who 
had lived in Palestine for generations. Following the institution of British rule in Palestine the Ottoman 
313 TAMA, 422/283b, pp. 185-186. 
314 Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 11. 
315 Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 1. 
316 Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 6. 
317 Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, pp. 8-9. 
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office of Hakham Bashi, the Jewish religious leader, was abolished in favour of a civil leadership in the 
form of European-Zionist organizations, while the Christian and Muslim leadership of the country 
remained in the hands of the Patriarchate and Mufitate, respectively.318 The Hakham Bashi had usually 
been a Sephardic rabbi, and this institutional change from above would do much to “[codify] the Zionist 
‘new order’ in Palestine that displaced the ‘Old Yishuv’ (which consisted of Sephardic-Mizrahi and 
Ashkenazi-Orthodox Jews).”319 In Tel-Aviv, this shift can be seen in an April 1921 discussion on the 
maintenance of the office of the Jaffa Hakham Bashi, shortly after the British edict nullifying the office. 
In a Tel-Aviv council meeting on the subject, the chairman explained that it had been decided by the 
Jaffa-Tel-Aviv Jewish community council that the Hakham Bashi’s office should continue to be 
maintained, and that Tel-Aviv needed to contribute toward this expense. Several members supported 
this motion, while several others opposed it and opposed any discussion of the matter. In the end, no 
decision was made, and in fact, the office remained vacant after the Hakham Bashi left Palestine for 
Thessaloniki, where he was offered the position of Chief Rabbi.320 However, when a decade earlier the 
office of Hakham Bashi for Jaffa was first instituted following a change to the Ottoman constitution, 
Ashkenazi members of Tel-Aviv’s council advocated for it, citing the benefits that could be accrued to 
the settlement from having a representative who could freely access the Ottoman authorities. Among 
the supporters of the appointment of Hakham Bashi were Arthur Ruppin, who wrote that the selection 
of a Sephardi candidate over an Ashkenazi opponent was a good one as he would be effective in his ties 
with the authorities.321 
Though in the late-19th century Sephardi and Ashkenazi communities in Palestine were differentiated 
by religious, cultural, and economic attributes, these differences did not prevent cooperation in Jaffa, 
318 Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 9. 
319 Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 9. 
320 TAMA, 422/283B, p. 247. Jaffa’s Hakham Bashi, Rabbi Uziel, would return several years later to become Tel-
Aviv’s Chief Sephardi Rabbi, the same one mentioned earlier in the Great Synagogue case. 
321 Ram, 1996, pp. 231-232. Sephardi Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Chai Uziel was selected over Ashkenazi Rabbi Yisrael 
Porat, who was endorsed by Turkey’s Hakham Bashi, even though the majority of those voting were Ashkenazi. 
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though they presented barriers that had to be crossed.322 By the early-20th century, and especially 
following the large-scale immigration of European Jews beginning in the 1920s, which coincided with 
British rule of Palestine, the different communities, including the Yemenite community, were 
essentialized by Ashkenazi leaders and intellectuals to such an extent that cooperation on an equal 
footing was often impossible. Thus, a 1924 article noted that higher mortality rates among Eastern Jews 
was the result of “a lower cultural level,” while Ashkenazim’s lower mortality rate was due to their 
“cultural and moral superiority.”323 Therefore, even though one of the main justifications for the 
establishment of Tel-Aviv and its differentiation from both Jaffa and slightly older neighbourhoods was 
the question of sanitation and housing and their effects on health, by the 1920s we see that these 
factors were not used to explain highly divergent mortality rates, and instead cultural differences were 
cited as the underlying causes.324  
Following the commencement of the Arab revolt of 1936, when many Jews of Jaffa moved their 
businesses to Tel-Aviv, we can see an increase in complaints by neighbours in the city’s southern 
quarters about the ‘Oriental’ cafes that began to appear there. These complaints both “highlighted the 
difference between the European and the Eastern and at the same time blurred…the difference 
between the Mizrahi Jews and the embodiment of the Arab east.”325 They included descriptions of the 
cafes’ patrons as “lazy or rather like the usual crowd in the Arab cafes of Jaffa,” playing card games, 
backgammon, and dominos, whose clicks, along with the piercing shrieks in Arabic “make the residents 
go mad.”326 Even before the revolt, though, Tel-Aviv banned the sale of Arak327 and the playing of 
dominos and cards in cafes. Though there is nothing to suggest that the consumption of Arak and the 
322 In Jerusalem the differences were more pronounced and cooperation was rare. 
323 Helman, 2011, p. 136 
324 Gershon Shafir, citing housing conditions in the agricultural settlement of Rehovot during World War I, notes 
that Yemenite workers and their families, who lived in tents and stables, suffered a 40% mortality rate, while 
Ashkenazi residents, who lived in houses, suffered an 8% mortality rate (Shafir, 1990, p. 179). 
325 Bernstein, 2008, p. 67. 
326 Bernstein, 2008, p. 69. 
327 An anise-flavoured alcoholic drink popular in the Middle-East.  
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playing of cards were only the hallmarks of Mizrahi residents, to the city’s European population they 
must have signified them as such, and this ordinance, unique to Tel-Aviv, “sharpened the difference 
between ‘European’ Tel-Aviv and the Orient that surrounded it.” It was an attack on the owners and 
patrons of these establishments, who were “ostracized as deviants from the norm.”328, 329 
Documents from the social service department of Tel-Aviv from the 1930s, and referred to by 
Deborah Bernstein,330 further highlight the way in which Mizrahi residents, and specifically women, 
were described in Orientalist terms, with essentialist characteristics ascribed to them. Thus, their 
families were designated as “uncultured” and the young women as possessing a “bounteous sexuality” 
that needed to be blocked. In a 1936 document, the Tel-Aviv social service department explained the 
sources of the "fallen teenage girl problem." Designating three categories of teenagers: working-class, 
middle-class, and Mizrahi, the document asserted that the first two are less in danger of moral 
corruption due to the high cultural and moral level of their surroundings, while the Mizrahi immigrants 
"mostly arrive from countries with low culture" and consequently their appreciation of women is low. 
"These immigrants bring with them a double poverty: material and spiritual...it falls to us of Western 
and Eastern European extraction to bring them closer to us by raising their cultural level.”331 As 
Bernstein notes, the document brings together the Western and Eastern Europeans as one social entity, 
while in Europe the distinction between the two was of utmost centrality.332 This united Eretz-Israeli 
European Jewry is now opposed to the Mizrahi Jewry, and is tasked with a mission civilisatrice towards 
328 Bernstein, 2008, p. 70. 
329 This was not a ban on alcohol consumption in general, but a targeted ban on a specific beverage favoured by 
Middle-Eastern drinkers. 
330 Bernstein, D. (2008). Women on the Margins: Gender and Nationalism in Mandate Tel-Aviv. Jerusalem: Yad Ben-
Zvi. 
331 Bernstein, 2008, p. 281. 
332 Bernstein, 2008, p. 281. See note 196 for background on the distinction of Ostjuden. 
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their Oriental brethren. Furthermore, the document shows that for its writer, only the European Jews 
had internal class distinctions, which were absent for Mizrahi teenagers.333,334  
A 1938 report by the newly established “school for Mizrahi working girls” described the “typical 
Mizrahi teenager” as:  
Loud, wild, cunning, primitive, having an almost childlike egoism, with no 
consideration for others...like all primitives who come in unmediated contact with 
civilization they absorb from it mainly negative aspects: an inexplicable 
externalization and an imagined freedom. Their close contact with the Ashkenazi 
families for which they are employed in housework leads them to forego their 
original character and customs, songs, dances, and handicrafts...instead they become 
accustomed to the foxtrot, and the tasteless copying of European dress and 
makeup.335 
Thus, not only do they come from low-cultured households, they are also unable to absorb the 
refined European culture, reduced instead to only a “tasteless copy” of it. 
Conclusion 
The reasons for the ethnic segregation of Tel-Aviv’s Jewish residents are many and varied. Personal 
choice and cultural affinity by the Mizrahi residents themselves must have played a part in their 
overwhelming numbers in buffer neighbourhoods between Arab Jaffa and mostly Ashkenazi Tel-Aviv. 
However, as the many examples of an Orientalist attitude by Ashkenazi leaders toward their Mizrahi 
coreligionists attest, the possibility of an equal partnership between the two groups was slim. Tel-Aviv 
was born of a segregationist drive, at first directed primarily at separation from the Muslim and 
333 the specific teenager referenced in the document had a father who was a porter, and a mother who was a 
laundress, yet she was not regarded as working class, which at the time and place of the writing of the document 
must have been a cultural category as much as, if not more than, an economic one. 
334 Bernstein, 2008, p. 282. 
335 Bernstein, 2008, p. 283. 
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Christian Arab population of Jaffa, but also from its earliest conception treating Arabized Jewish 
neighbourhoods with contempt and derision. 
The shift from separate and sometimes conflicting urban religious communities in 19th century 
Palestinian cities, to cooperation under more secular conditions later in the century, and then to an 
Ashkenazi segregationist drive in the early 20th century was a gradual one. Both Lorenzo Veracini’s 
theorization of settler-colonialism and Carl Nightingale’s conceptualization of the sources of urban 
segregation help to explain the segregationist drive and segregated reality of pre-1948 Jaffa-Tel-Aviv. 
Early examples of racist attitudes held by several key members of the Zionist enterprise, and specifically 
of key figures in the establishment of Tel-Aviv such as Arthur Ruppin and Itzhak Khayutman, make way 
in the 1920s and 1930s to more structured forms of racism, as European immigration to the city 
increases, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as Palestine and Jaffa transition from a Middle-
Eastern, Ottoman-ruled province, to a British Mandate. Under Ottoman rule, Sephardi Ottoman citizens 
often had advantages over Ashkenazi immigrants, though the latter group was also subject to the 
capitulation regime, and therefore had advantages of its own. Both groups contributed to the expansion 
of Jewish Jaffa’s geographic footprint, but Sephardi land entrepreneurs and community leaders were 
indispensable to it, acting as land agents and as middlemen and go-betweens for the community and 
the authorities. Following the takeover by Britain of administration of Palestine, the advantages of the 
Sephardi members of the community were nullified, and the settler-colonial and segregationist attitudes 
of European immigrants could come to the fore unchallenged by practical concerns.  
In the geographic context of Tel-Aviv, this segregationist attitude prevailed first in a continuous drive 
to separate physically and administratively from Arab Jaffa, but also to either assimilate Mizrahi 
residents into an Ashkenazi hegemonic culture, rebranded as an Eretz Yisrael culture, or to segregate 
those unwilling to give up their culture, forming a buffer area between largely Ashkenazi Tel-Aviv and 
largely Arab Jaffa. 
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Figure 2 - Residents of Givat Amal being evacuated on 21 September 2014. (photo credit: Tomer Neuberg/Flash90) source: 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/police-clear-out-tel-aviv-neighborhood-for-second-time/  
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“This land denies, 
cheats, and betrays us; 
its dust can't bear us 
and grumbles about us - 
resents and detests us. 
Its newcomers, 
sailors, and usurpers, 
uproot the backyard gardens, 
burying the trees.” - Taha Muhammad Ali, Ambergris 
Introduction 
The photo on the cover page captures the moments after the demolition by police-escorted 
bulldozers of a residential neighbourhood at the heart of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa. In the foreground, an elderly 
man leans on a cane and on a younger man, his shirt says: ‘Givat Amal – Fighting for our Home.’ In the 
background, the bases of high-rise luxury apartment buildings can be seen. But the real background of 
the image extends decades into the past, when the site of this economically motivated eviction was also 
the site of a previous one, motivated by nationalism.  
The neighbourhood of Givat Amal is the geographical continuation of a long-standing Palestinian 
agricultural village—al-Jammasin al-Gharbi—that was first surrounded by an expanding Tel-Aviv, and 
then abandoned by its residents in the months of violence leading to the official commencement of the 
1948 war. The village residents were soon replaced by mostly Sephardi Jewish refugees from war-
ravaged neighbourhoods on the buffer of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, to the chagrin of the municipality of Tel-
Aviv, which had its own designs for the development of the land. Al-Jammasin al-Gharbi/Givat Amal is an 
exemplar of the intersection of settler colonialism, segregation as a planning tool for economic 
development (and its failures), and the space and place of buffer populations in the modern segregated 
city. 
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Al-Jammasin al-Gharbi 
The Arab village of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi was located in marshland approximately 6.5 km north of 
the city of Jaffa, in the coastal plain of Palestine. The name of the village can be translated from Arabic 
into ‘water-buffalo breeders, west,’ a reference to the villagers’ primary occupation and source of 
livelihood, and a geographic distinguisher from a twin village further to the east. An early reference to 
the villagers, if not the village, can be found in Ottoman tax registers of 1596, in which a tribe called 
Jammasin is mentioned in the Nablus sub-prefecture, and whose members paid taxes on water buffalo. 
By the 18th century the village had been established, consisting mostly of conical or pyramidal huts made 
of tree logs and branches, with some adobe brick buildings as well. The population of the village was 
approximately 200 people in 1922, and over 1,000 by 1944.336 
The residents of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi raised buffalo and marketed meat and milk in Jaffa, and 
cultivated citrus, bananas, and cereals as well.337 According to LeVine, as late as the 1990s, Jaffa 
residents had fond memories of Jammasin, as that is where their milk came from.338 
Tel-Aviv 
The rapid increase in population was not only restricted to al-Jammasin al-Gharbi and other 
Palestinian villages and towns, but was also quite substantial with the Jewish population of Palestine, 
and specifically in this case, of Jaffa and Tel-Aviv, largely through immigration from Europe.  
When it was established in 1909, Ahuzat Bayit (later Tel-Aviv) stood about halfway between Jaffa and 
al-Jammasin al-Gharbi. The founders of Ahuzat Bayit envisioned their neighbourhood as the nucleus of a 
new Jewish city, completely independent of Jaffa. The founders’ goal was the economic conquest of 
Jaffa, and this included the expansion of the new town’s territory.339 
336 Khalidi, 1992, p. 244 
337 LeVine, 2005, p. 195 
338 LeVine, 2005, note 170, p. 282 
339 LeVine, 1998, p. 40 
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Tel-Aviv was established under Ottoman control of Palestine, and local Ottoman leaders attempted to 
curb its expansion, administratively by leaving it as a neighbourhood of Jaffa, and geographically by 
trying to prevent its access to the sea through public works.340 However, following the British conquest 
of Palestine in 1918, and its award of a colonial Mandate over it by the League of Nations in 1921, Tel-
Aviv was granted municipal status, and its already rapid expansion increased. This expansion was led by 
both a settler-colonialist desire to control as much as possible of Palestine’s coast for economic and 
strategic reasons, as well as by “the rapid increase in population and the speculatory rise in land prices 
in both Tel-Aviv and Jaffa that it fuelled.”341  
As the city expanded in size, it eventually “ran out of uncontested land on which to expand. Even 
within the municipal boundaries, much of the sandy land in the north was still owned by Arabs and was 
becoming more difficult to purchase.”342 These difficulties would lead to creative solutions by the city’s 
leaders and planners, utilizing the inherited Ottoman land designations and the British desire to 
reconcile land registration. 
Ottoman Land Designation and British Land Reform 
The Ottoman land law of 1858 divided land into six classes, which allowed for different levels of 
private and public ownership, including private usage of public lands.343 Much of the land surrounding 
and included in the municipal boundaries of Tel-Aviv was designated as Matruka—public or communal 
land such as roads or pasture. In the Jaffa-Tel-Aviv region, this land type was especially important due to 
the presence of at least three villages with semi-sedentary Bedouin populations who relied on livestock 
grazing for a living (this includes the villagers of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi).344 
340 LeVine, 1998, p. 40 
341 LeVine, 1998, p. 41 
342 LeVine, 1998, p. 41 
343 Home, 2003, pp. 296-297; LeVine, 1998, p. 37 
344 LeVine, 1998, p. 37 
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According to Robert Home, land was central to colonial projects and control of land was achieved 
through an array of legal instruments. Differential territorial control had an important role in regulating 
social relationships and in excluding and marginalizing unwanted social groups.345 The British utilized 
several colonial tools in land administration, including the Torrens land registry system established in 
Australia. In addition, the British had experience with Ottoman land law from their protectorates in 
Cyprus, Egypt, and Sudan. The British Surveyor-General of Egypt (Dowson) introduced ‘scientific survey’ 
to the adjudication of Palestinian land rights, and the Scottish municipal engineer of Khartoum 
introduced planning regulations to Jerusalem.346  British colonial policy between the two world wars 
followed a Lugardian ideology that “recognized a separation of systems of law and government within a 
‘dual mandate’.”347 This ideology saw the role of the colonizer as bringing scientific progress to the 
colony while interfering as little as possible with native customs and modes of thought.348 The dual 
mandate required a separate development strategy for colonizer and colonized, further complicated by 
immigrant racial groups, which the British both encouraged and sought to curb in the interests of 
protecting the ‘natives’ (not only in Palestine—Chinese in Malaya, Indians in East Africa). In Palestine, 
the British Mandate both promoted the Zionist project and acted as ‘trustee’ of Palestinian interests, 
two irreconcilable aims.349 
The Mandate administration passed no less than 40 ordinances on land matters in its first 15 years, in 
what has been called “a masterpiece of how colonial regimes occupy legal systems.”350 Soon after 
occupying Palestine, the British closed the Ottoman land registers, prohibited all land transactions until 
a new registry was installed, and transferred jurisdiction of all land matters from Sharia [religious] courts 
345 Home, 2003, p. 292 
346 Home, 2003, p. 295 
347 Home, 2003, p. 293 
348 Reminiscent of the French colonial policy of association discussed in Chapter 1. 
349 Home, 2003, p. 293 
350 Home, 2003, p. 295 
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to new, secular land courts.351 Under British law, three of the land-use designations were brought under 
tighter state control, becoming de facto, if not de jure, state land. The rigidness of the new law would 
not support the old system whereby villages made use of land when needed and left it fallow at other 
times.352 
Town Planning Legislation under the British Mandate 
The Mandate government’s 1920 Land Transfer Ordinance had two main purposes: stimulation of 
economic growth and capital investment that accompanied land ‘development,’ and regulation of the 
purchase of land to prevent speculation and protect small landowners and tenants from eviction. During 
the following decade the ordinance restrictions that were to assure the second purpose were gradually 
stripped away, and the ensuing mass evictions and displacement of Arab cultivators were subsequently 
found to be the main cause of large-scale riots that erupted in 1929.353 
A series of town-planning ordinances granted the High Commissioner of Palestine and the Town 
Planning Commission the exclusive power to designate town-planning areas and to regulate planning 
and development, powers that until then had rested with municipal councils, such as the Jaffa 
municipality. “The High Commissioner was also empowered to grant public bodies (such as municipal 
corporations) and private individuals or bodies (such as Zionist land purchasing organizations) the power 
to expropriate land, as long as it was designated for ‘public use’.”354  
Tel-Aviv’s Growth at the Expense of Arab Villages 
One of the first by-laws passed by the Tel-Aviv Council was one prohibiting the sale of land to non-
Jews.355 Continued land purchases from Arabs by Jews without the possibility of selling land in the other 
351 Home, 2003, p. 295 
352 LeVine, 1998, p. 38 
353 LeVine, 1998, p. 38 
354 LeVine, 1998, p. 39 
355 LeVine, 1998, p. 40 
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direction has been likened by Oren Yiftachel to “a black hole into which Arab land enters but can never 
be retrieved.”356  
Mandate ordinances passed in 1927 and 1934 further separated Tel-Aviv from Jaffa, and a 1933 
municipal law gave municipalities greater power to expand their borders. However, even with an 
expanded municipal boundary, Tel-Aviv’s growth was hampered by Arab-owned land to its north.357 It 
was during this time that Tel-Aviv tried to gain control of the Arab land surrounding it, including the Jaffa 
neighbourhood of Manshiyya, the village of Summayl, and al-Jammasin al-Gharbi. In the case of 
Manshiyya, the rationale was that the Jewish population of the neighbourhood was “dependant 
economically upon the development of Tel-Aviv, and their material condition depends on the 
improvements that the township introduces.”358 In the case of Summayl, the rationale was that the land 
was sparsely populated and presented the only possibility of expansion for the city.359 At a 1937 meeting 
to determine the boundary between Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, the former’s mayor “explained that Tel-Aviv 
would offer municipal privileges to all owners of the lands it sought to annex and that some owners had 
already asked for pipelines.”360, 361   
Though the issue was left unresolved, Tel-Aviv would continue its attempts to annex Arab land in its 
environs throughout the Mandate period. “Such lands were still considered ‘practically undeveloped,’ 
and it was thought vital to bring them under ‘complete municipal authority’ because only the ‘legal and 
administrative machinery of a municipal corporation’ would have the power to draw up a ‘creative or 
positive machinery of development.’”362 
356 Yiftachel, 2006, p. 110 
357 LeVine, 1998, p. 41 
358 LeVine, 1998, p. 42 
359 LeVine, 1998, p. 42 
360 LeVine, 1998, p. 42 
361 This is yet another example of the tendency of Tel-Aviv to use its abundant water supply to control and annex 
neighbouring communities, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
362 LeVine, 1998, p. 44 
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Despite the failure by Tel-Aviv to fully control al-Jammasin al-Gharbi’s land, Jewish land purchases of 
the village’s lands continued such that by 1944, slightly more than half of it was under Jewish 
ownership.363 In a confidential letter by Lydda District Commissioner to the Chief Secretary of the 
Mandate government, dated 2 June 1947, “[Summayl], the Jammasins and Jarisha” were described as 
having “been practically swallowed by Tel-Aviv already,” and Sheikh Muwwanis as being “surrounded 
but not yet surrendered completely.”364 
The 1948 War and al-Jammasin al-Gharbi 
In February 1947, following rising violence between Palestinians,365 Jews, and the British, and having 
given up on finding a solution on its own, the British government “transferred the question of Palestine 
to the United Nations.”366 A United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended 
partition of Palestine into two federated states, one for Jews and one for Palestinians, and this 
recommendation was passed in November 1947 as UN General Assembly resolution 181.367 According to 
the partition plan, the Jews, who owned less than six percent of the total land of Palestine and 
constituted no more than a third of its population, would get more than half of its total territory. Within 
the proposed future Jewish state, Jews formed a small majority of approximately 60% overall, 368 but 
were a small minority in many districts.369 
The Palestinians and the Arab League dismissed the partition plan, while the Zionist leadership made 
preparations to repel a potential attack from neighbouring Arab states and to occupy as much of the 
country as possible, and hopefully all of it.370 An eventual Arab attack materialized, but only on 15 May 
363 Khalidi, 1992, p. 244 
364 ISA, SF/10/39, p. 386. 
365 Palestinians refers to the indigenous Muslim and Christian Arab population of Palestine. 
366 Pappe, 2006, p. 31 
367 Pappe, 2006, p. 31 
368 Pappe, 2006, p. 48 
369 Pappe, 2006, p. 34 
370 Pappe, 2006, p. 42 
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1948, on the day following implementation of the partition plan, and five and a half months after the 
partition resolution had been adopted. In the intervening period, Jewish military operations had already 
begun.371 The leader of the Zionist movement in Palestine, David Ben-Gurion, had already said in 1937 
that the absence of a Jewish majority in a future state “would compel the Jewish settlers to use force to 
bring about the ‘dream’ [of a] purely Jewish state,” and on 3 December 1947, he reiterated his 
commitment to ethnic cleansing in order to achieve a Jewish majority.372 
The initial plan for cleansing the future state of Palestinians was based on the assumption of 
Palestinian attacks on Jews, and forceful retaliatory counterattacks. However, to the chagrin of the 
Jewish leadership, the Palestinian citizenry continued life as normal and attacks by them were rare.373 
When the Palestinian attacks failed to materialize, Ben-Gurion’s advisers suggested creating an 
atmosphere of terror for the Palestinians by “destroying the traffic (buses, lorries…and private 
cars)…sinking their fishing boats in Jaffa...The initial reaction may be riots, but eventually they will 
understand the message.”374 This new policy of intimidation was soon implemented, beginning with 
what the Haganah—the principal paramilitary organization of the Jewish community—called “violent 
reconnaissance,” in which Jewish units would enter Palestinian villages in search of ‘infiltrators,’ and if 
any resistance was encountered the Jewish troops, would fire at random and kill several villagers.375  
In early December 1947, some villagers had evacuated Jammasin.376 During December 1947 and 
January 1948, the leaders of several villages in the area of Tel-Aviv, including Jammasin, met with 
Haganah representatives and expressed a desire for peace.377 However, small armed Arab gangs began 
using the village as a sniping post, and in response a Haganah patrol was sent in. The Haganah troops 
371 Pappe, 2006, p. 47 
372 Pappe, 2006, p. 48 
373 Pappe, 2006, p. 52 
374 Pappe, 2006, p. 54 
375 Pappe, 2006, pp. 55-56 
376 Morris, 2004, p. 126. No specific reason is given for this evacuation, though it was not an isolated case, as other 
villages also began to send away women and children at the same time, some to nearby villages, thus contributing 
to demoralization within them, and others to villages and towns in the hinterland, known today as the ‘West Bank.’  
377 Morris, 2004, p. 91 
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told the remaining inhabitants “that there was nothing to fear,” yet on that day or the next, the 
remaining inhabitants “began ‘to leave in a panic,’” moving to Kafr Qassim and Jaljulya.378  
Though the prevalent Zionist discourse about the Palestinian flight is that they left voluntarily except 
for a few isolated cases, Pappe argues that they “left with the full intention of returning to their homes 
again later, only to be prevented by the Israelis from doing so,” and that “not allowing people to return 
to their homes after a short stay abroad is as much expulsion as any other act directed against the local 
people with the aim of depopulation.”379 As we will see next, in order to prevent the possibility of 
return, the Zionist authorities quickly settled Jewish refugees in the village. 
Jewish Settlement in al-Jammasin al-Gharbi 
“In mid-January 1948, the total number of Jewish war refugees in Tel-Aviv stood at approximately 
7,000, and they lived in temporary dwellings: tents, public structures, warehouses, and even the lobbies 
of Tel-Aviv apartment buildings.”380 These internal refugees were “poor former residents of southern 
Tel-Aviv slums and mostly of Middle-Eastern or North-African descent.”381 According to Ella Shohat, 
“European Zionists were not enthralled by the prospect of ‘tainting’ the settlements in Palestine with an 
infusion of Sephardi Jews. The very idea was opposed at the first Zionist Congress.”382 At the same time, 
Zionists recognized early on the economic benefits of bringing in “Jews in the form of Arabs” to the 
“land of Israel” as a cheap workforce to replace the Arab fellahin [peasants] of Palestine.383 However, 
once they had come to ‘Zion,’ these immigrants were marginalized physically, economically, and 
378 Morris, 2004, p. 126 
379 Pappe, 2006, p. 54 
380 Golan, 2002, p. 120 
381 Golan, 2002, p. 121 
382 Shohat, 1988, p. 15 
383 Shohat, 1988, p. 14 
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culturally by the dominant European Jews, and relegated to slum neighbourhoods in the buffer area 
between Jaffa and Tel-Aviv.384 
The Tel-Aviv municipality began confiscating abandoned Arab property in early December 1947, using 
an abandoned house in the village of Sumeil as a school and home for Jewish children displaced from 
their homes by the fighting. Displaced Jewish families were soon housed in al-Jammasin al-Gharbi and 
Sumeil, in a move initiated by a Haganah commander who lacked the troops to properly garrison the 
villages. By the end of February there were 170-180 families in Jammasin, and by February 1949, when 
the village was officially incorporated into the Tel-Aviv municipal area, it had more than 1,000 Jewish 
inhabitants.385 The Tel-Aviv municipality did not look favourably upon the settlement of refugees in al-
Jammasin al-Gharbi, as it would have to provide them with services at its own expense, and also as the 
village was already part of its planning area and was designated for redevelopment following the 
demolition of the Arab built-up area.386 
Many of the village’s new residents were living in structures that were previously used as barns and 
stables, and quickly began construction of new shacks to replace them. Though the municipality 
approved additional construction according to a plan that its planning department would design, the 
residents were not willing to wait and began construction without official permits. Following clashes 
between the new residents and city officials, who brought in Haganah forces as an escort, and after the 
city decided to cut services and postpone construction of public buildings in the village-turned-slum, the 
residents agreed to help prevent further illegal construction.387 Following the surrender of Jaffa on 13 
May 1948, many Jewish war refugees returned to their former homes, however, many others could not 
do so, either because their homes were destroyed, their landlords would not have them back, or 
because they did not want to return to the slums from which they came. Many of these refugees 
384 See Chapter 2 of this work, as well as Golan, 2002, p. 121; Helman, 2011, pp. 136, 141 
385 Morris, 2004, p. 384 
386 Golan, 2002, p. 120 
387 Golan, 2002, p. 121 
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crowded into al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, swelling its population to more than 1,000.  While the Tel-Aviv 
municipality could not evict the Jewish refugees from the former Arab village, it did very little to 
improve their living conditions as residents.388 The land of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi was considered as the 
main potential for further development of the city’s European (Ashkenazi) middle- and upper-class 
residential areas, and the eviction of the poorer refugees, mostly of Middle-Eastern and North-African 
(Mizrahi) origin, was seen as “essential for the implementation of any future development plan.”389 
Besides the Tel-Aviv municipality, national-level institutions also had their eye on the lands of al-
Jammasin al-Gharbi for the development of housing estates for their constituents. The new residents of 
al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, seeing their new homes threatened by new development, appealed to Ben-
Gurion, now the Prime Minister of the new state. Ben-Gurion, who led a socialist party and did not want 
to appear as the enemy of the destitute, declared that although illegal squatting “would not be 
tolerated, no steps would be taken to evacuate shantytown residents until a permanent housing 
solution was found.” Following this declaration, the municipality gave up on evacuating the village, and 
began to improve the level of municipal services provided to its residents, in essence recognizing their 
occupation of the former Arab village.390 
Though the new residents of Jammasin were allowed to remain in place, the former Palestinian 
village, soon to be renamed Givat Amal, would remain a poor slum in the heart of affluent north Tel-
Aviv.  
From Arab Lands to State Lands 
With its Palestinian residents gone, and new Jewish residents moving in, how could ownership of the 
land of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi be transferred? Though slightly more than half of the village’s land was in 
Jewish hands at the onset of the 1948 war, the rest remained under Palestinian ownership. However, 
388 Golan, 2002, p. 121 
389 Golan, 2002, p. 121 
390 Golan, 2002, p. 122 
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the Palestinian owners were gone and they would not be allowed to return. This was a problem that 
would confront the new state throughout its territory, where private Jewish or state ownership 
accounted for only 13.5% of the land.391 To solve this problem, a legal process commenced that would 
take twelve years and would proceed in four phases, relying on new legislation, as well as Mandate 
ordinances and Ottoman land designations.392 It would also be inspired by a 1939 British law regarding 
confiscation of property of those charged with trading with the enemy, and by Pakistani legislation 
dealing with the same land-ownership problem Israel faced, following Pakistan’s own war of 
independence and population transfer with India.393 The full process is quite interesting and complex, 
but there is no room in this paper to discuss it in any detail. The Forman & Kedar article cited here 
provides a very thorough understanding of the process.  
A similar process of confiscation of property by a state happened shortly after the creation of the 
state of Israel, when the Iraqi government ‘allowed’ its Jewish citizens to renounce their citizenship and 
leave the country, but only by giving up their property. This process was seen as a “gift from the gods to 
the Israeli government,” which would use it to offset its own confiscation of Arab property, in what 
Yehouda Shenhav has likened to ‘double-entry bookkeeping.’394 
From State Lands to Private Lands 
When the legislative process ended in 1960, the State of Israel, along with the Jewish National Fund 
and the Israel Development Authority owned 93% of the land in Israel. This included the formerly 
Palestinian-owned land of Jammasin, which was transferred by the state to the Israel Development 
Authority. In 1961, following the final resolution of the land ownership question, the Development 
Authority sold the land of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi to a private company, B.P. Housing Co., which was 
391 Forman & Kedar, 2004, p. 812 
392 Forman & Kedar, 2004, p. 814 
393 Forman & Kedar, 2004, p. 815 
394 Shenhav, 2006, p. 125 
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owned by the nation’s largest bank. The sale was contingent on the new owners building a 
neighbourhood of 440 apartments and providing each of the families living on the land with a home of 
equal value to the one they would be evacuating.395  
B.P. never built the apartments and was never sanctioned by the state in any way for its failure to do 
so, nor was the land renationalized. The land was subsequently sold to a succession of developers, the 
last of whom hold building rights to five apartment buildings in what has become one of the most 
exclusive areas of Tel-Aviv (and from whose development the municipality stands to significantly benefit 
as part owner of the land). The residents of Givat Amal have expanded their homes over the years, and 
their children have built homes in the neighbourhood as well. The newest owners and the residents 
have been locked in legal battles over their rights to the land, but the Supreme Court of Israel eventually 
ruled that the residents have no rights to the properties or to any compensation,396 which brings us back 
to the image at the beginning of this paper. 
Who Benefits? 
It is interesting to note that while ownership and control of land is central to the Zionist ideology, and 
any potential loss of land through sale to private interests is seen as having catastrophic 
consequences,397 the Development Authority was quick to sell the lands of Jammasin to private 
interests. This double standard would repeat itself throughout the state’s history, and as Yiftachel 
argues and Yonah & Saporta support through case studies, is rooted in the hierarchical ethnic mix of 
Israel as an ethnocratic state. Yiftachel’s term for this ethnic stratification is ethnoclass, with the 
Ashkenazi ethnoclass benefitting from occupying “the upper echelons of society in most spheres”,398 
395 “Tel-Aviv’s”, 2014, para. 4 
396 “Tel-Aviv’s”, 2014, paras. 9 & 10 
397 see Yonah & Saporta, 2002, p. 92 
398 Yiftachel, 2006, p. 103 
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and thus having access to better Palestinian housing in Jerusalem (see below), or being able to purchase 
formerly Palestinian land in Tel-Aviv.  
As we have seen, most of the land of the State of Israel was Arab-owned at the time of independence, 
and was transformed through a legal process to state ownership. Many former Palestinian villages were 
razed, while others were used to house Jewish refugees and immigrants, such as al-Jammasin al-Gharbi 
and Salame in the Tel-Aviv area, and Lifta in the Jerusalem area.399 Internal refugees and immigrants 
were the first ones to be settled in these areas, one could say as placeholders. But as can be seen from 
an example in Jerusalem, soon after the war, allocation of formerly Arab housing for lower class 
residents was confined to “those apartments that were in such bad shape that the cost of renovation 
was too high,” while “houses in the elegant neighborhood of Talbiyya were reserved exclusively for 
senior officials and those with important connections, such as judges and professors at Hebrew 
University.”400  
In Yiftachel’s theory of ethnocracy, an ethnocratic society is based on “deeply ingrained patterns of 
segregation…resulting in three major ethno-classes: founders, immigrants, and indigenous.”401 In the 
Jerusalem case above, the founders and immigrants and their differential allocation of resources are 
clearly seen. In the case of Jammasin/Givat Amal, the founders—in this case the Tel-Aviv municipality as 
well as other Zionist institutions—were shut out of the neighbourhood by decree, but in the long run 
they had the resources and patience to claim for themselves that which they were temporarily denied. 
Imagined Geography 
The indigenous group, the Palestinians, is absent both physically and in the popular Israeli narrative of 
both Talbiyya and al-Jammasin al-Gharbi. As Edward Said says, “Perhaps the greatest battle Palestinians 
399 Shoshan & Bronstein, 2006 
400 Krystall, 1998, p. 18. 
401 Kedar, 2003, p. 403. This division reiterates the one expounded by Veracini in his theorization of settler-
colonialism: the settler colonizer, the indigenous colonized, and a variety of exogenous others (Veracini, 2006, p. 
16). 
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have waged as a people has been over the right to a remembered presence.”402  The initial historical 
erasure of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi and its residents was in renaming a Palestinian village called al-
Jammasin al-Gharbi as a Jewish neighbourhood with a Hebrew name—Givat Amal.403 This renaming is 
“an act of taking possession, much like other rituals of appropriating land such as raising a flag or 
planting a cross,”404 and is a step in the process of ‘imagined geography.’  This term, coined by Said, 
describes “a process initiated by groups with territorial ambitions who reinvent meanings about the 
landscapes they covet, and frame discourses justifying why they are entitled to take control of the 
places being reinvented.”405  
Said’s ‘imagined geography’ has been developed by Gary Fields into the concept of ‘enclosure 
landscapes,’ the outcomes on the landscape of re-imagining and remaking geography.406 The 
practitioners of enclosure reorganize sovereignty and stewardship by three means: cartographical, legal, 
and architectural.407 In the case of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, these means were renaming and splitting the 
village into two neighbourhoods—Givat Amal A (since redeveloped as luxury condominiums known as 
Akirov Towers) and B; the legal process briefly described above that transformed Arab lands into state 
lands, which were then sold into private lands; and the soon-to-be-built new luxury towers.  
Recent Developments 
The past few years have seen a number of forced expulsions of residents, and a series of lawsuits and 
countersuits. The latest lawsuit, brought by two displaced residents of Givat Amal, is aimed at the Tel-
402 Said, 2000, p. 184. 
403 In a series of letters from the village’s new Jewish residents to the provisional Israeli government, requesting 
that a road passing through the village be paved, the renaming of the district can be seen as a work in progress. In 
the original handwritten letter, dated 29 November 1948, the reference by the village council head is to Jammasin 
B village. Several subsequent internal government memos refer to the village by the same name (one naming it 
Jammasin A). However, in a typewritten copy of the original letter, provided by the State Labour and Construction 
Ministry on 10 February 1949, the village is already referred to as Gvaot (plural of Givat) Amal-Jammasin, thus 
altering the original letter. (ISA, ISA-NetiveiIsrael-NetiveiIsrael-000o1vx). 
404 Fields, 2011, p. 190. 
405 Fields, 2011, p. 182 
406 Fields, 2011, p. 183 
407 Fields, 2011, p. 184 
94 
 
                                                          
Aviv-Jaffa municipality and the Israel Land Authority. The plaintiffs claim that the neighbourhood was 
deliberately neglected by the authorities for seventy years, and that when the residents were given a 
chance to formalize their settlement and gain ownership of the land, the municipality interceded to 
prevent such an outcome. The lawsuit brings as evidence the minutes of municipal meetings from the 
past sixty years, in which high-ranking municipal officers attempted to block any resolution in favour of 
the residents, and which reveal a plan to wilfully neglect the neighbourhood’s needs in order to compel 
the residents to leave on their own.  
When the residents turned to the Development Authority in 1960 to purchase the rights to the land 
they were living on, the mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, Mordechai Namir, asked the Authority to stop any such 
sale. In a meeting between the mayor and his deputies two days later, it was decided to prevent the 
purchase by residents, and to turn to a private development company instead, which would guarantee 
housing arrangements for the residents. This plan followed a similar one undertaken at the time with 
another neighbourhood in the city, Nordia, in which Eastern-European immigrants were residing. 
However, one of the deputy mayors, Yehoshua Rabinovich, was sceptical about the success of the same 
model in Givat Amal, as “the human element in Givat Amal is different from Nordia’s.”408 
In a municipal-council meeting held in August, 1987, the mayor responded to a question from Givat 
Amal residents about a 22% increase in municipal tax rates to the same level of surrounding 
neighbourhoods, despite the former not receiving the same level of services, by saying that “the 
situation there is really bad, and I intend for there to be even worse services…so that they will 
understand that I have no intention for them to continue living there forever.”409 
Meanwhile, the developers have already begun marketing one of the projects proposed on 
Jammasin/Givat Amal’s land, as the advertisements that greeted me at the airport on my arrival for my 
research show: 
408 “For Decades”, 2016, para. 6 
409 “For Decades”, 2016, para. 9 
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 Figure 3 - Promotional sign for Park Bavli development. Captions read "High-End Residence in the Heart of Tel 
Aviv" and "We Won't Tell if You Won't Tell." Source: Rotem Erez 
 
Figure 4 - Promotional sign for Park Bavli development. Caption reads "No One Needs to Know That You Live 
Right above the Park". Source: Rotem Erez 
The proposed projects include the four-tower, 46 story “Park Bavli” development, which will include 
approximately 700 condominiums, and the 44 story “BeReshit Tower,” which will have 174 
condominiums. The Park Bavli advertisement campaign follows a theme of secrecy, with the ads saying 
such things as “nobody needs to know that you live right above the park” and “nobody needs to know 
that there’s a secret spa in your building.” This supposed secrecy is meant to give the project a sense of 
prestige that is only available to those in the know, yet the greatest secret of the project, which is not 
advertised to the potential purchasers of units in the project, is that the secret park in which the towers 
will be built covers the ruins of a neglected urban slum, built on the ruins of a depopulated Palestinian 
village.410 
410 In his analysis of the advertising campaign, Itay Ziv likens the park to the supposed sands on which Tel-Aviv was 
built, and which Sharon Rotbard has called a moral alibi for the city (“They Won’t,” 2015, last paragraph). 
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Conclusion 
The case of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi/Givat Amal B/Park Bavli demonstrates the interconnections of the 
logics and policies of settler colonialism, segregation as a planning tool for economic development, and 
the role of buffer populations in both. Tel-Aviv’s early segregation into a largely Ashkenazi city, with 
Mizrahi residents relegated to southern buffer neighbourhoods, and the existence of Palestinian villages 
within its planning jurisdiction, came together during the 1948 war to create several islands of neglect in 
which Mizrahi refugees from the buffer neighbourhoods ‘interfered’ with the city’s orderly planning. Yet 
as the quotes above from municipal officials attest, instead of accepting these residents’ unplanned 
settlement in their city, the municipality has continuously attempted to get rid of them so that it could 
continue with the job of providing value to itself and to its valued residents through so-called rational 
planning practices, which are only rational when the right population is present. This is also an 
encapsulation of the contradiction between Zionism’s claimed intent of creating a homeland for all Jews, 
and the continued practice of favouring one ethnic group of Jews over others. Soon, Givat Amal B, like 
al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, will no longer exist and for all intents and purposes will never have existed within 
the popular discourse. Instead, the soon-to-be-constructed luxury condominiums of Park Bavli will 
overlook the luxury condominiums of Akirov Towers, and the displaced Mizrahi residents will be 
forgotten, much like their Palestinian predecessors. 
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Conclusion 
As the three chapters of this paper show, Tel-Aviv, as a settler-colonial city, has relied on a buffer 
population of internal others to mediate its antagonistic relations with its progenitor, Jaffa, and the 
artificial social hierarchy thus created has had its own internal contradictions with repercussions that 
reverberate to this day. Tel-Aviv both drew from Zionism’s ideology and helped shape it as it quickly 
became Palestine’s largest Jewish settlement and the centre of Zionist institutions in Palestine. Though 
there were similarities between the early development of Casablanca and Tel-Aviv, the two cities did not 
follow similar logics, as the former was a colonial city while the latter was a settler-colonial city. Thus, 
while attempts at segregation in Casablanca (and Moroccan cities in general) failed due to the 
precedence of economic exploitation over that of population control, in Tel-Aviv the latter imperative 
took the ascendancy over the former, though profit making through real-estate speculation was still 
prevalent. In cases where segregated populations ‘broke through’ the lines of segregation, such as the 
al-Jammasin al-Gharbi/Givat Amal case, the municipality did not know how to respond except to box the 
‘invading’ population in and leave its neighbourhoods in a continued and deteriorating state of neglect, 
waiting, hoping, and actively working toward their final ‘voluntary’ departure. Yet when this departure 
showed no signs of coming through, the municipality had private developers take on the task of 
removing the residents forcefully, with the aid of the police and judicial system. 
The archival research I conducted at the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa archive was limited in time, and therefore 
concentrated mainly on city council meeting minutes. However, as the examples from Deborah 
Bernstein’s Women on the Margins (2008) have shown, an expanded search of the city’s social service 
department records as well as other sources from this and other archives could expand the narrative 
and strengthen the arguments made in this paper. Furthermore, while I concentrated on the origins of 
urban segregation in Tel-Aviv, the research could be expanded to explain if and how it has been actively 
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maintained, especially since the formation of the State of Israel, which brought about the formal 
annexation of the southern Jewish neighbourhoods as well as of Jaffa itself, and the influx of large 
numbers of Mizrahi immigrants to the country. A current resurgence of Mizrahi activism, largely centred 
on cultural issues, also calls into question the history of culture in this divided city, whose official culture 
for most of its existence has been ‘Israeli,’ which like in the synagogue debate mentioned in Chapter 2 
was a code-name for Ashkenazi. Looking to the future, it would be interesting to explore how the forced 
segregation and cultural and economic marginalization of Mizrahi and Arab populations could form the 
basis for a unified struggle for recognition, equality, and for the possibility of a true rather than 
contrived coexistence.411 The recent formation of two Mizrahi activist groups, one favouring a struggle 
for cultural recognition within Zionism412 and the other calling for a joint struggle of Mizrahi and 
Palestinian activists,413 has to some extent formalized and politicized the recent Mizrahi resurgence, and 
has shown that it is not a singular phenomenon, but one with different visions and tactics. It is 
interesting to note the role of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa in this resurgence, with many of the activists residing, 
creating, and organizing in the city and its environs, especially in the southern neighbourhoods and 
Jaffa, which are home to several alternative community groups and cultural venues.414 A further 
resurgence is seen in Jaffa, where the narrative of the Nakba is continually and increasingly voiced by 
411 I borrow the term ‘contrived coexistence’ from Daniel Monterescu’s Jaffa Shared and Shattered (2015), whose 
final chapter, based on a paper co-written with Noa Shaindlinger, shows the possibilities as well as limits of a 
unified struggle. 
412 Tor HaZahav [The Golden Age] calls for strengthening the Israeli periphery, traditional (Mesorti) Judaism, and 
the “Zionist-Mizrahi story”. They claim to have grown tired of the old public debate about, among other things, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and are searching for “an alternative Mizrahi Zionism: a Zionism of the pioneers who 
built the cities of the periphery, created magnificent communities, and created an original Israeli culture.” 
(http://www.tor-hazahav.org/ (Hebrew)) 
413 Mizrahit Meshutefet (Joint Mizrahi) calls for “an Eastern Joint Initiative – ‘Mizrahi Palestinian Partnership,’” 
calling on “all the oppressed groups in Israeli society to join hands and walk together: Palestinians, Mizrahim, 
Ethiopians, Russian-speakers, the people who are living in conditions of poverty, everyone that is pushed to the 
periphery and the social margins, and anyone that strives to fundamentally change the existing situation and fight 
oppression.” They view the formation of the mostly Palestinian Joint List political party as an “historic opportunity 
to establish a partnership.” (https://mizrahipalestinianpartnership.wordpress.com/2016/05/10/open-call-an-
eastern-joint-initiative-mizrahi-palestinian-partnership/). 
414 These include the Achoti [sister] Mizrahi feminist organization (http://www.achoti.org.il/?page_id=414), Café 
Gibraltar (http://cafe-gibraltar.com/ (Hebrew), the Albi Café, and Anna Loulou Bar. 
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both Palestinian and Jewish activists, who insist on sharing and publicizing the Palestinian history and 
present in the city, and imagining its future.415 
 
  
415 Monterescu, 2015, pp. 277-278 
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